Matter of General Elec. Capital Corp. v Loretto-Utica Residential Health CareFacility
2010 NY Slip Op 07217 [77 AD3d 1468]
October 8, 2010
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
As corrected through Wednesday, December 15, 2010


In the Matter of General Electric Capital Corporation, by Alfred W.Popkess, as Receiver, Respondent, v Loretto-Utica Residential Health Care Facility et al.,Appellants.

—[*1]Pinsky & Skandalis, Syracuse (Dean J. Dipilato of counsel), for respondents-appellants.Harris Beach PLLC, Pittsford (A. Vincent Buzard of counsel), for petitioner-respondent.

Appeal from an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Oneida County (AnthonyF. Shaheen, J.), entered May 14, 2009 in a proceeding pursuant to RPAPL article 7. The order andjudgment, inter alia, granted the motion of petitioner to confirm the report of the referee and for theentry of money judgments against respondents for rent arrears.

It is hereby ordered that the order and judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed withoutcosts.

Memorandum: Petitioner commenced this summary proceeding pursuant to RPAPL article 7seeking, inter alia, money judgments against respondents for unpaid rent. General Electric CapitalCorporation (GECC) previously commenced a mortgage foreclosure action, and petitioner wasappointed temporary receiver in that action. In the instant summary proceeding, Supreme Courtappointed a Referee and authorized him, pursuant to an order of reference, to determine the amount ofunpaid rent owed by respondents. Following a hearing, the Referee determined that respondents owed$11,212,461 in back rent, and the court thereafter entered money judgments totaling that amountagainst respondents. We reject the contention of respondents that reversal is required because theywere denied their right to a jury trial, as requested in their answer. By failing to object to the order ofreference and by participating without objection in the hearing conducted by the Referee, respondentswaived their right to a jury trial (see Matter ofUnion Indem. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 67 AD3d 469, 471 [2009], lv dismissed 14 NY3d859 [2010]; Matter of Nilda S. v Dawn K., 302 AD2d 237 [2003], lv denied 100NY2d 512 [2003]). In any event, respondents admitted that they had not paid any rent forapproximately eight years, since December 2000, and we thus conclude that they were not entitled to ajury trial because they failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see RPAPL 745 [1]; Matter ofRodgers v Crumb, 242 AD2d 874 [1997]).

We reject the further contention of respondents that the court erred in confirming the Referee'sreport in the absence of a finding that they had breached the leases. The leases unambiguously requiredrespondents to pay rent in an amount equal to the landlord's expenses associated with maintaining theproperty, including the amount necessary to pay the mortgage. As noted, respondents admitted thatthey paid no rent for eight years, and the mere fact that the landlord ceased making mortgage paymentsto the mortgagee did not relieve respondents of their obligation to pay rent under the leases. Thus, theonly unresolved issue for the Referee to determine was the precise amount of unpaid rent.

Contrary to the contention of respondents, the court did not abuse its discretion in severing thecauses of action for money judgments from the causes of action seeking eviction of respondents andpossession of the premises in question. "The decision whether to grant severance 'rests soundly in thediscretion of the . . . court and, on appeal, will be affirmed absent a demonstration ofabuse of discretion or prejudice to a substantial right' " (Rapini v New Plan Excel Realty Trust, Inc., 8 AD3d 1013, 1014[2004]). Here, we perceive no abuse of discretion, and respondents have failed to demonstrateprejudice based on the severance, particularly in view of the fact that the court stayed enforcement ofthe money judgments until "a proper party, entity or operator" of each of the respective facilities is inplace and approved by the Department of Health.

We agree with respondents, however, that petitioner should have obtained a new index number forthis summary proceeding pursuant to RPAPL article 7 rather than using the index number for themortgage foreclosure action. Nevertheless, the failure to purchase a new index number does notmandate reversal where, as here, a substantial right of a party is not prejudiced (see CPLR2001; Matter of Miller v Waters, 51AD3d 113, 115-116 [2008]). Finally, we conclude that the court properly awarded judgment toGECC directly inasmuch as GECC is ultimately entitled to the proceeds of the money judgments(see generally Chase Manhattan Bank v Brown & E. Ridge Partners, 243 AD2d 81, 84-85[1998]). Present—Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Lindley and Sconiers, JJ.


NYPTI Decisions © 2026 is a project of New York Prosecutors Training Institute (NYPTI) made possible by leveraging the work we've done providing online research and tools to prosecutors.

NYPTI would like to thank New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, New York State Senate's Open Legislation Project, New York State Unified Court System, New York State Law Reporting Bureau and Free Law Project for their invaluable assistance making this project possible.

Install the free RECAP extensions to help contribute to this archive. See https://free.law/recap/ for more information.