| Matter of Reiss v Giraldo |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 07353 [77 AD3d 759] |
| October 12, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Matthew Reiss, Appellant, v Maria NellyGiraldo, Respondent. |
—[*1] Maria C. Marinello, New York, N.Y., for respondent. Nestor Soto, Astoria, N.Y. (John C. Macklin of counsel), attorney for the child.
In a visitation proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, the petitioner appeals from anorder of the Family Court, Queens County (Moriber, J.), dated March 17, 2009, which, after ahearing, dismissed the petition with prejudice.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
While public policy generally mandates free access to the courts (see Board of Educ. ofFarmingdale Union Free School Dist. v Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Assn., Local 1889, AFTAFL-CIO, 38 NY2d 397, 404 [1975]), a party may forfeit that right if he or she abuses thejudicial process by engaging in meritless litigation motivated by spite or ill will (see Matter of Molinari v Tuthill, 59 AD3d722, 723 [2009]; Matter of Pignataro vDavis, 8 AD3d 487, 489 [2004]; Matter of Shreve v Shreve, 229 AD2d 1005, 1006[1996]; Sassower v Signorelli, 99 AD2d 358, 359 [1984]). Here, considering that the father,who was seeking visitation rights, refused to give his home address, completely failed to cooperate witha court-ordered investigation by the Administration for Children's Services, and disrupted the courtproceedings to such an extent that security had to be called, the Family Court providently exercised itsdiscretion in dismissing the petition with prejudice (see Matter of Simpson v Ptaszynska, 41 AD3d 607, 608 [2007];Matter of Pignataro v Davis, 8 AD3d at 489; Matter of Manwani v Manwani, 286AD2d 767, 768 [2001]; Duffy v Holt-Harris, 260 AD2d 595, 596 [1999]; Matter ofShreve v Shreve, 229 AD2d 1005 [1996]).
Contrary to the father's contentions, he does not fall within any of the classes of persons entitled tothe assignment of counsel under the provisions of Family Court Act § 262 (see Matter ofMolinari v Tuthill, 59 AD3d at 723; Matter of Edwards v Cade, 33 AD3d 1087 [2006]; Matter of Wardv Jones, 303 AD2d 844 [2003]). Moreover, under the circumstances now before us, we concludethat the father was not entitled to assigned counsel under the United States Constitution or the NewYork Constitution (see Family Ct Act § 262 [b]; Matter of Ward v Jones, 303AD2d at 844-845). In any event, the record shows that the father was indeed assigned counsel, butthat such counsel was excused after the father refused to communicate with him or cooperate with anyaspect of the proceeding (see generally Matter of Mooney v Mooney, 243 AD2d 840, 841[1997]).
The father's remaining contentions are without merit. Mastro, J.P., Dickerson, Eng and Lott, JJ.,concur.