People v Bryant
2010 NY Slip Op 07383 [77 AD3d 485]
October 19, 2010
Appellate Division, First Department
As corrected through Wednesday, December 15, 2010


The People of the State of New York, Respondent,
v
RickeyBryant, Appellant.

[*1]Richard M. Greenberg, Office of the Appellate Defender, New York (Rosemary Herbert ofcounsel), for appellant.

Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Patricia Curran of counsel), forrespondent.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (William A. Wetzel, J.), rendered November 26,2007, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree(two counts) and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third and fifth degrees, andsentencing him to an aggregate term of nine years, unanimously affirmed.

The court properly denied defendant's suppression motion. The police properly stopped the car inwhich defendant was riding after the driver committed traffic violations. Defendant argues that therecovery of the contraband at issue was the fruit of an unnecessarily prolonged traffic stop. Thatargument is without merit, because the police lawfully arrested the driver for unauthorized use of avehicle. The driver admitted "knowing that he [did] not have the consent of the owner" (PenalLaw § 165.05 [1] [emphasis added]), which was a rental company. The driver stated that heborrowed the car from the lessee, and the rental agreement did not list the driver as an additionalperson authorized by the owner to drive the car.

At trial, the People introduced a letter found on the person of the driver (a jointly triedcodefendant) that contained instructions for completing a drug transaction. As we observed inaddressing whether there was a legitimate nonhearsay purpose for this evidence in connection with ahearsay issue raised on the codefendant's appeal (People v Overton, 66 AD3d 604 [2009], lv denied 14 NY3d772 [2010]), the letter was relevant to the codefendant's intent to sell the drugs he possessed. Thecourt properly declined to exclude this evidence, or to grant defendant a mistrial and severance. Afurther limiting instruction would have sufficed to prevent any prejudice, but defendant declined thatremedy (see People v Young, 48 NY2d 995 [1980]). In any event, while we conclude that thecourt should have charged the jury that the letter was received only for its bearing on the codefendant'sintent and for no other purpose, any error was harmless in view of the overwhelming evidenceconnecting defendant to the drugs and weapons in the car.

We perceive no basis for reducing the sentence. Concur—Gonzalez, P.J., Tom, Catterson,Moskowitz and Richter, JJ.


NYPTI Decisions © 2026 is a project of New York Prosecutors Training Institute (NYPTI) made possible by leveraging the work we've done providing online research and tools to prosecutors.

NYPTI would like to thank New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, New York State Senate's Open Legislation Project, New York State Unified Court System, New York State Law Reporting Bureau and Free Law Project for their invaluable assistance making this project possible.

Install the free RECAP extensions to help contribute to this archive. See https://free.law/recap/ for more information.