| Matter of State of New York v Craig T. |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 07423 [77 AD3d 1062] |
| October 21, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of State of New York, Respondent, v CraigT., Appellant. |
—[*1]
Spain, J.P. Appeals from two orders of the Supreme Court (Tait, J.), entered March 26, 2009and April 14, 2009 in Broome County, which, in a proceeding pursuant to Mental Hygiene Lawarticle 10, found respondent to be a dangerous sex offender and confined him to a securetreatment facility.
Pursuant to a guilty plea, respondent was convicted in 2001 of rape in the second degree inconnection with charges arising out of his repeated sexual relations with his then-13-year-olddaughter over the course of approximately six weeks. Sentenced to four months in county jail and10 years of probation, respondent was released on time served immediately following hisconviction until, in 2005, he violated the terms of his probation when a drug screen came backpositive and he was resentenced to a term of imprisonment of 1 to 4 years. Prior to respondent'srelease date, petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law article 10seeking a determination that respondent is a dangerous sex offender requiring civil management.Supreme Court conducted a jury trial pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 10.07 (d), at theconclusion of which the jury found that respondent was a detained sex offender who suffers froma mental abnormality. A bench trial on the issue of whether respondent was a dangerous sexoffender requiring confinement was then held pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 10.07 (f).Supreme Court concluded that civil confinement of respondent was necessary. Respondent now[*2]appeals, contesting only Supreme Court's finding that herequires civil confinement, rather than strict and intensive supervision and treatment (hereinafterSIST) on an outpatient basis.[FN*]
We affirm. Pursuant to the Mental Hygiene Law, following a jury's determination that arespondent suffers from a mental abnormality, it is for the court to determine whether he or she"is a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement or a sex offender requiring strict andintensive supervision" (Mental Hygiene Law § 10.07 [f]). A determination that therespondent is a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement requires proof "by clear andconvincing evidence that the respondent has a mental abnormality involving such a strongpredisposition to commit sex offenses, and such an inability to control behavior, that therespondent is likely to be a danger to others and to commit sex offenses if not confined to asecure treatment facility" (Mental Hygiene Law § 10.07 [f]).
No dispute exists that the trial testimony established that respondent is a sex offenderrequiring civil management (see Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03 [q]; § 10.07[f]). In reaching this conclusion, the jury apparently credited the testimony of two expertwitnesses who opined, based on respondent's sexual fantasies and crimes involving adolescentgirls, his early onset of antisocial and criminal conduct, his continuing problems with substanceabuse and his inability to tell consistent versions of events, that respondent suffers fromantisocial personality disorder with psychopathic traits. During the dispositional phase ofrespondent's trial, psychologist Trica Peterson testified that respondent's mental health conditionsand substance abuse issues resulted in a strong predisposition to reoffend, and that SIST wouldnot be sufficient to prevent respondent from reoffending at this time. She also noted that, due torespondent's manipulative and controlling behavior and his minimal treatment to date, he was nota good candidate for one-on-one or outpatient treatment.
In contrast, psychologists Erik Schlosser and Joseph Plaud testified that respondent is acandidate for SIST. Schlosser acknowledged respondent's mental abnormality, his strongpredisposition to reoffend and his inability to self-manage his antisocial behavior, but opined thatextensive supervisory steps could be taken to keep respondent on his treatment program andprevent him from reoffending. Plaud—who testified during the jury trial that respondentdoes not suffer from any diagnosable sexual or personality disorder—opined thatrespondent does not pose any real risk of reoffending, especially in light of the facts that theinstant crime was one of incest and there was a three-year period following the crime duringwhich respondent did not engage in any known criminal sexual behavior.
Mindful that "Supreme Court was in the best position to evaluate the weight and credibilityof the conflicting psychiatric testimony presented" (Matter of State of New York v [*3]TimothyJJ., 70 AD3d 1138, 1144 [2010]; see Sterling v Sterling, 21 AD3d 663, 665 [2005]), we defer to thecourt's decision to credit Peterson's testimony over that of the other two psychologists. We areunpersuaded by respondent's suggestion that Peterson's opinions should be discredited becauseshe did not view him as an incest offender, despite the fact that his most recent crimes wereagainst his biological daughter. Respondent did not meet his daughter until she was 13, justmonths prior to the commencement of the abuse, and he admits that he immediately beganmanipulating and cultivating the relationship to fulfill his own agenda. Importantly, Peterson'sopinion was also based on a prior offense against an unrelated child and respondent's admittedsexual fantasies involving teenage girls. Indeed, given respondent's repeated dismal performancein sexual offender treatment programs as well as his history of substance abuse, documentedmanipulative behaviors and dishonesty, we decline to disturb Supreme Court's finding thatrespondent presents an unacceptable risk of danger to the community at this time (seeMental Hygiene Law § 10.03 [e]; Matter of State of New York v Timothy JJ., 70AD3d at 1144; Matter of State of NewYork v Donald N., 63 AD3d 1391, 1394 [2009]).
Rose, Kavanagh, McCarthy and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the orders are affirmed,without costs.
Footnote *: The jury's finding thatrespondent suffers from a "mental abnormality"—statutorily defined as "a congenital oracquired condition, disease or disorder that affects the emotional, cognitive, or volitional capacityof a person in a manner that predisposes him or her to the commission of conduct constituting asex offense and that results in that person having serious difficulty in controlling such conduct"(Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03 [i])—is not at issue (see Mental Hygiene Law§ 10.07 [d]).