Shayovich v 800 Ocean Parkway Apt. Corp.
2010 NY Slip Op 07525 [77 AD3d 814]
October 19, 2010
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, December 15, 2010


Toby Shayovich et al., Appellants,
v
800 Ocean ParkwayApartment Corp. et al., Respondents.

[*1]Herschel Kulefsky, New York, N.Y. (Ephrem J. Wertenteil of counsel), for appellants.Borchert, Genovesi, LaSpina & Landicino, P.C., Whitestone, N.Y. (Anthony J. Genovesi, Jr.,Gregory M. LaSpina, and Gary E. Rosenberg of counsel), for respondents 800 Ocean ParkwayApartment Corp., 800 Ocean Pkwy Apts, LLC, and Newport Management Company, LLC.Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP, New York, N.Y. (Joseph P. Wodarski ofcounsel), for respondent Precision Elevator Corp.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal, as limited bytheir brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Schack, J.), datedSeptember 9, 2009, as granted that branch of their motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3126 tostrike the defendants' answers on the ground of spoliation of evidence only to the extent ofdirecting the defendant Precision Elevator Corp. to provide them with records of the elevatormodernization in 2008 by a specified date.

Ordered that the order is modified, on the facts and in the exercise of discretion, by addingthereto a provision granting that branch of the plaintiffs' motion which was pursuant to CPLR3126 to the further extent of directing that an adverse inference charge be given at trial; as somodified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs to the plaintiffspayable by the defendants appearing separately and filing separate briefs.

In August 2005 the plaintiff Toby Shayovich allegedly was injured in a building at 800Ocean Parkway, in Brooklyn, when she stepped into a misleveled elevator. She and her husband,suing derivatively, commenced this action against the building owners and managementcompany (hereinafter collectively the building defendants) and Precision Elevator Corp.(hereinafter Precision), which had contracted to maintain the elevator. In March 2008 theplaintiffs served a notice requesting an inspection of the elevator. Despite their awareness of thisrequest, and without affording the plaintiffs an opportunity to inspect the elevator, the buildingdefendants and Precision proceeded with modernization of the elevator and discarded certain ofits components. The plaintiffs moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike the defendants'answers. The Supreme Court granted that branch of the plaintiffs' motion only to the extent ofdirecting that Precision disclose [*2]the records relating to themodernization of the elevator. We modify.

The Supreme Court has broad discretion in determining the appropriate sanction forintentional or negligent spoliation of evidence (see Zaytsev v Zelman, 73 AD3d 909 [2010]; Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v Berkoski Oil Co.,58 AD3d 717, 718 [2009]; De LosSantos v Polanco, 21 AD3d 397, 397-398 [2005]). In making this determination, thecourt must consider the degree to which the spoliation prejudiced the party aggrieved (see Gotto v Eusebe-Carter, 69 AD3d566, 567-568 [2010]; Lichtenstein vFantastic Mdse. Corp., 46 AD3d 762, 764 [2007]). Here, the defendants modernized theelevator and discarded the parts despite their awareness of the plaintiffs' request for aninspection. Nevertheless, given the amount of time that passed from the date of the accident tothe date the plaintiffs requested an inspection, the degree to which the plaintiffs may have beenprejudiced by the spoliation was only modest, and they did not show that the spoliation left them"prejudicially bereft" of a means of proving their claims (Fossing v Townsend Manor Inn, Inc., 72 AD3d 884, 885 [2010][internal quotation marks omitted]). Consequently, the Supreme Court properly denied thatbranch of the plaintiffs' motion which was to strike the defendants' answers (id.).Nevertheless some sanction beyond provision of the records of the modernization is warranted,and we modify the order to direct that, as well, an adverse inference charge be given at trial(see Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v Berkoski Oil Co., 58 AD3d at 718). Fisher, J.P., Dillon, Florioand Lott, JJ., concur.


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