Vargas v Luxury Family Corp.
2010 NY Slip Op 07530 [77 AD3d 820]
October 19, 2010
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, December 15, 2010


Maritza Vargas et al., Respondents,
v
Luxury Family Corp.et al., Appellants.

[*1]Lewis Johs Avallone Aviles, LLP, Melville, N.Y. ((Michael G. Kruzynski and SethWeinberg of counsel), for appellants.

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal froman order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Jacobson, J.), dated March 17, 2009, whichgranted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the plaintiffs' motion forsummary judgment on the issue of liability is denied.

On December 5, 2007, on Bushwick Avenue in Brooklyn, near its intersection with MoffatStreet, a vehicle owned and operated by the plaintiff Maritza Vargas, in which the plaintiffRuben Vargas was a passenger, was struck in the rear by a vehicle operated by the defendant SMTanvir Uddin (hereinafter Uddin) and owned by the defendant Luxury Family Corp.

"A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle creates a prima facie case ofnegligence against the operator of the rear vehicle, thereby requiring that operator to rebut theinference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision" (Klopchin v Masri, 45 AD3d 737,737 [2007]; see Hakakian vMcCabe, 38 AD3d 493 [2007]). Here, the plaintiffs satisfied their prima facie burden ofestablishing their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability bydemonstrating that their vehicle was stopped or stopping when it was struck in the rear by thevehicle operated by Uddin. In opposition, the defendants submitted, inter alia, Uddin's affidavit,wherein he stated that because of slippery road conditions resulting from falling snow, he wastraveling well below the speed limit approximately two to three car lengths behind Vargas'svehicle, when Vargas's vehicle stopped suddenly and without warning in the lane of traffic for noapparent reason. Uddin applied his brakes, but was unable to stop before striking Vargas'svehicle in the rear. Thus, the defendants raised triable issues of fact as to whether Vargasnegligently operated the vehicle and caused the accident (see Foti v Fleetwood Ride, Inc., 57 AD3d 724, 725 [2008]; Delayhaye v Caledonia Limo & Car Serv.,Inc., 49 AD3d 588 [2008]; Klopchin v Masri, 45 AD3d at 738; Morrison v Montzoutsos, 40 AD3d717, 717-718 [2007]; Brodie vGlobal Asset Recovery, Inc., 12 AD3d 390 [2004]). Accordingly, the Supreme Courtshould have denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability. Rivera,J.P., Skelos, Chambers and Roman, JJ., concur.


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