| Matter of New York State Crime Victims Bd. v Sookoo |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 07641 [77 AD3d 1227] |
| October 28, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of New York State Crime Victims Board, on Behalfof Sylvia Hayes, Respondent, v Michael Sookoo, Appellant. |
—[*1] Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General, Albany (Owen Demuth of counsel), forrespondent.
Cardona, P.J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (McNamara, J.), enteredSeptember 22, 2009 in Albany County, which, in a proceeding pursuant to Executive Law§ 632-a, granted petitioner's motion for a preliminary injunction.
Respondent was convicted of murder in the second degree and was sentenced in 2001 to aprison term of 20 years to life. In March 2009, petitioner was notified by the Department ofCorrectional Services that respondent's inmate account exceeded $10,000 (see ExecutiveLaw § 632-a [2] [b]). This information was relayed to the victim's mother who thennotified petitioner that she, as the representative of the victim, intended to commence a civilaction for money damages against respondent (see Executive Law § 621 [6];§ 632-a [2] [c]; [3]). Thereafter, petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to the Sonof Sam Law seeking a preliminary injunction to preserve the subject funds (see ExecutiveLaw § 632-a [4], [5], [6]). Supreme Court granted petitioner's application, and this appealensued.
Initially, respondent contends that petitioner acted without authority in seeking a provisionalremedy on behalf of the victim's mother inasmuch as she does not qualify as a representativewithin the meaning of the Executive Law and, in any event, she did not request that petitionermove for injunctive relief. However, such contentions were not advanced before [*2]Supreme Court and, therefore, are not properly before us (seeCity of Albany v Central Locating Serv., 228 AD2d 920, 922 [1996]; General MotorsAcceptance Corp. v Bank of Richmondville, 203 AD2d 851, 853 [1994]).
Next, respondent's assertion that certain funds in his account—specifically the $2,452drawn from a pension fund—qualify as "[e]arned income" and, thus, cannot be considered"[f]unds of a convicted person" eligible for recovery in a civil action (Executive Law §632-a [1] [c], [f]) is misplaced. The distinction between earned and unearned income is relevantonly to determine whether petitioner must be notified, and has no effect on the ability of a crimevictim or a victim's representative to recover such income in a civil action (seeGovernor's Approval Mem, Bill Jacket, L 2001, ch 62, at 3, reprinted in 2001 NY Legis Ann, at44; Senate Introducer Mem in Support of L 2001, ch 62, reprinted in 2001 McKinney's SessionLaws of NY, at 1306).
Furthermore, we find no error in Supreme Court granting the injunctive relief. Althoughgenerally unavailable in actions for money damages, injunctive remedies are permitted in casessuch as this (see Matter of New YorkState Crime Victims Bd. v Harris, 68 AD3d 1269, 1271-1272 [2009]). Inasmuch as therecord demonstrates that petitioner satisfied the criteria for obtaining a preliminary injunction(see CPLR 6311, 6312), Supreme Court's order will not be disturbed (see Matter ofNew York State Crime Victims Bd. v Harris, 68 AD3d at 1271-1272; Matter of New York State Crime VictimsBd. v Mitchell, 12 AD3d 870 [2004], lv denied 4 NY3d 707 [2005]).
Respondent's remaining contentions have been reviewed and found to be without merit.
Peters, Rose, Malone Jr. and Stein, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, withoutcosts.