Atlas El. Corp. v United El. Group, Inc.
2010 NY Slip Op 07699 [77 AD3d 859]
October 26, 2010
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, December 15, 2010


Atlas Elevator Corp., Respondent,
v
United ElevatorGroup, Inc., et al., Appellants.

—[*1]L. Blake Morris, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Kerry Fontana of counsel), for appellants.

Holihan & Associates, P.C., Richmond Hill, N.Y. (Michael Kauke of counsel), forrespondent.

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of contract, the defendants appeal froman order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Kitzes, J.), entered November 29, 2007, whichdenied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff and United Elevator Group Company, Inc., sued herein as United ElevatorGroup, Inc. (hereinafter United Elevator), were both in the business of servicing and maintainingelevators. The defendant Ron Liska was the president of United Elevator. In or about March2006, the plaintiff and United Elevator entered into negotiations concerning the prospectivepurchase, by United Elevator, of the plaintiff's assets, goodwill, and customer list and, amongother things, the prospective assumption of all elevator service and maintenance contracts andaccounts the plaintiff had with its customers. During the course of negotiations, and while thedefendants were performing a due diligence review of the plaintiff corporation, the partiesentered into a one-sentence confidentiality letter agreement (hereinafter the confidentialityagreement). The confidentiality agreement recited that it "constitutes confidentiality," andprovided that "any information pertaining to the sale of maintenance accounts . . .will not be disclosed." The confidentiality agreement was printed on United Elevator's stationeryand was signed by both Liska and John Blunnie, the president of the plaintiff. Neither Liska norBlunnie signed as an officer of his respective corporation. Ultimately, the underlying purchasetransaction was never consummated. It is undisputed that United Elevator nonetheless enteredinto service agreements with one or more of the plaintiff's former customers.

The plaintiff commenced this action, alleging, among other things, that in connection withthe unconsummated purchase transaction, the defendants acquired its confidential customer list,and wrongfully used that list to their advantage and to its detriment, in violation of theconfidentiality agreement. The plaintiff alleged that the customer list amounted to confidentialinformation not otherwise available to the defendants. The defendants moved for summaryjudgment dismissing the complaint, asserting, among other things, that the confidentialityagreement was not a [*2]noncompetition agreement, and that theplaintiff's customers were readily ascertainable from nonconfidential sources. The defendantsalso argued that Liska was not a proper defendant, as he was acting in his corporate capacity atall relevant times. The Supreme Court denied the defendants' motion, and we affirm.

" 'Implicit in all contracts is a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the course of contractperformance . . . This embraces a pledge that neither party shall do anything whichwill have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of thecontract . . . Where the contract contemplates the exercise of discretion, this pledgeincludes a promise not to act arbitrarily or irrationally in exercising that discretion' " (Lonner v Simon Prop. Group, Inc., 57AD3d 100, 108 [2008], quoting Dalton v Educational Testing Serv., 87 NY2d 384,389 [1995]). The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing " 'is breached when a party to acontract acts in a manner that, although not expressly forbidden by any contractual provision,would deprive the other party of the right to receive the benefits under their agreement' " (P.T.& L. Contr. Corp. v Trataros Constr.,Inc., 29 AD3d 763, 764 [2006], quoting Aventine Inv. Mgt. v Canadian ImperialBank of Commerce, 265 AD2d 513, 514 [1999]). "The implied covenant of good faithencompasses 'any promises which a reasonable person in the position of the promisee would bejustified in understanding were included' in the agreement, and prohibits either party from doing'anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party toreceive the fruits of the contract' " (1-10 Indus. Assoc. v Trim Corp. of Am., 297 AD2d630, 631 [2002], quoting Dalton v Educational Testing Serv., 87 NY2d at 389).

Here, viewing the evidence submitted by the defendants in the light most favorable to theplaintiff (see Pearson v Dix McBride,LLC, 63 AD3d 895 [2009]), which opposed the motion, the defendants failed toestablish their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. While the defendants may not haveviolated the express terms of the one-sentence confidentiality agreement by disclosinginformation to third parties, they failed to eliminate all issues of fact as to whether they violatedthe covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied into the confidentiality agreement bydeveloping maintenance and service contracts with the plaintiff's customers by use of theplaintiff's customer list. Contrary to the defendants' contention, they failed to eliminate all issuesof fact as to whether the plaintiff's customer list was indeed a trade secret (see generallyAshland Mgt. v Janien, 82 NY2d 395 [1993]), or whether it was "readily ascertainable" (Suburban Graphics Supply Corp. vNagle, 5 AD3d 663, 666 [2004]; see Atmospherics, Ltd. v Hansen, 269 AD2d343, 343 [2000]).

The defendants also failed to establish their entitlement to judgment as a matter of lawdismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against Liska on the ground that he was acting onlyin his capacity as a corporate agent, and not in his individual capacity. Liska, in his affidavit,failed to allege that he acted solely in his corporate capacity in his dealings with the plaintiff, andthe defendants failed to explain, inter alia, Liska's execution of the confidentiality agreementwithout adding any title to his name or explicitly stating that he was acting in his capacity as anofficer or president of United Elevator (cf. Lawlor v Hoffman, 59 AD3d 499, 500 [2009]; Maggio vBecca Constr. Co., 229 AD2d 426 [1996]) or, if so, whether he acted in good faith (seeMurtha v Yonkers Child Care Assn., 45 NY2d 913, 915 [1978]).

Since the defendants failed to satisfy their initial burden on their motion for summaryjudgment, it is not necessary to consider whether the plaintiff's papers in opposition weresufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see Levin v Khan, 73 AD3d 991, 992 [2010]).

The defendants' remaining contention is without merit. Dillon, J.P., Florio, Leventhal andChambers, JJ., concur.


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