| Matter of Jayquan J. (Clint J.) |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 07763 [77 AD3d 947] |
| October 26, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Jayquan J. SCO Family of Services, Appellant, etal., Petitioner; Clint J., Respondent. |
—[*1] Richard P. Reyes, New York, N.Y., for respondent. Steven Banks, New York, N.Y. (Tamara A. Steckler and Patricia Colella of counsel),attorney for the child.
In a proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b to terminate the putativefather's parental rights on the ground of abandonment and determine that his consent is notrequired for the child's adoption pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 111, the petitionerappeals from an order of the Family Court, Kings County (Beckoff, J.), dated September 24,2009, which, after a fact-finding hearing, dismissed the petition and found that the putativefather's consent is required for the child's adoption pursuant to Domestic Relations Law §111.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, the petition toterminate the putative father's parental rights on the ground of abandonment and to determinethat his consent is not required for the child's adoption pursuant to Domestic Relations Law§ 111 is granted, and the matter is remitted to the Family Court, Kings County, fordisposition.
Contrary to the Family Court's determination, the petitioner established, by clear andconvincing evidence, that the putative father (hereinafter the father) abandoned the child in thesix months immediately preceding the filing date of the petition (see Social Services Law§ 384-b [4] [b]; [5]). While the father was not afforded the notice to which he was entitledof the original removal proceeding, and of permanency hearings that predated the filing of thepetition to terminate his parental rights, the record demonstrates that these inexcusablederelictions by the petitioner neither prevented nor discouraged the father from maintainingcontact with the child (see Matter ofAnnette B., 4 NY3d 509 [2005]). Moreover, fully crediting the father's testimonyconcerning his desire to maintain contact and his efforts to obtain information about the child, asthe Family Court did, his efforts were minimal, sporadic, and insubstantial, and therefore wereinsufficient to preclude a finding of abandonment (see Social Services Law §384-b [5] [b]; Matter of Annette B., 4 NY3d at 514; Matter of Xtacys Nayarie M. [Jose Ruben M.], 74 AD3d 970[2010]; Matter of Jeremiah KwimeaT., 10 AD3d 691 [2004]; Matter of Kimberly Y., 9 AD3d 412 [2004]).[*2]
In addition, the father did not establish, by clear andconvincing evidence, that he maintained regular communication with the child or the petitionerand provided financial support, according to his means, for the child. Thus, contrary to theFamily Court's finding, the father's consent to the child's adoption pursuant to DomesticRelations Law § 111 (1) (d) is not required (see Matter of Aaron P., 61 AD3d 448 [2009]; Matter of Sharissa G., 51 AD3d1019 [2008]; Matter of HassanLawrence W., 42 AD3d 573 [2007]; see also Matter of Dominique P., 24 AD3d 335, 336 [2005]).Further, the father's incarceration did not absolve him of the responsibility to provide financialsupport for the child, according to his means, and to maintain regular contact with the child orthe petitioner (see Domestic Relations Law § 111 [1] [d]; Matter of Mathew Niko M. [Niko M.],71 AD3d 440 [2010]; Matter ofKevin A., Jr., 61 AD3d 859 [2009]; Matter of Serenity Anya C., 60 AD3d 852 [2009]; Matter of Sharissa G., 51 AD3d1019 [2008]; Matter of HassanLawrence W., 42 AD3d 573 [2007]; see also Social Services Law § 384-b[2] [b]). Skelos, J.P., Eng, Belen and Hall, JJ., concur.