| Davis v Cornerstone Tel. Co., LLC |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 07842 [78 AD3d 1263] |
| November 4, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| Lawrence A. Davis, Also Known as Larry Davis, Individually and asShareholder of Combined Solutions, Inc., and as a Member of Cornerstone Telephone Company,LLC, Appellant, v Cornerstone Telephone Company, LLC, et al.,Respondents. |
—[*1] Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, L.L.P., Albany (Peter A. Lauricella of counsel), forrespondents.
Rose, J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Platkin, J.), entered September 23, 2009 inAlbany County, which, among other things, denied plaintiff's cross motion to compel certain discoveryfrom defendants.
The facts of the parties' dispute are set forth in our prior decision, in which we affirmed SupremeCourt's dismissal of all of plaintiff's causes of action with the exception of the portion of plaintiff's claimfor unjust enrichment due to non-monetary services he allegedly provided to defendants after August28, 2001 (Davis v CornerStone Tel. Co.,LLC, 61 AD3d 1315 [2009]). When plaintiff then made sweeping discovery demands,Supreme Court granted defendants' motion for a protective order to the extent that it limited thedemands to items pertaining to the services provided between August 28, 2001 and December 31,2001. We affirm.[*2]
"[T]he trial court is vested with broad discretion to supervisediscovery and determine what is 'material and necessary' under CPLR 3101 (a)" (Mora v RGB, Inc., 17 AD3d 849, 851[2005]; see Detraglia v Grant, 68 AD3d1307, 1308 [2009]; Czarnecki vWelch, 23 AD3d 914, 915 [2005]). While the words "material and necessary" are to beliberally construed " 'to require disclosure, upon request, of any facts bearing on the controversy whichwill assist preparation for trial by sharpening the issues and reducing delay and prolixity' " (Mitchellv Stuart, 293 AD2d 905, 906 [2002], quoting Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21NY2d 403, 406 [1968]), "[t]he party seeking disclosure must demonstrate how the requested materialsare relevant to the issues in the matter" (Matter of People v Pharmacia Corp., 39 AD3d 1117, 1118 [2007]; see Aaron v Pattison, Sampson, Ginsberg &Griffin, P.C., 69 AD3d 1084, 1085 [2010]; Vyas v Campbell, 4 AD3d 417, 418 [2004]).
Inasmuch as plaintiff is barred by the statute of limitations from seeking recovery for any servicesprovided prior to August 28, 2001, and he concedes that he had no dealings with defendants beyond2001, Supreme Court properly limited plaintiff's demands to this time period on the ground that hisrecovery for unjust enrichment is limited to "the reasonable value of the services rendered by theplaintiff" (Collins Tuttle & Co. v Leucadia, Inc., 153 AD2d 526, 527 [1989]; see Snyder v Bronfman, 13 NY3d 504,508 [2009]; IDT Corp. v Morgan StanleyDean Witter & Co., 12 NY3d 132, 142 [2009]; Giordano v Thomson, 564 F3d163, 170 [2009]). While there are circumstances in which equity may warrant a different measure ofdamages (see e.g. Empire Fin. Servs., Inc. vBellantoni, 53 AD3d 1095, 1097 [2008]; Mayer v Bishop, 158 AD2d 878, 881[1990], lv denied 76 NY2d 704 [1990]), plaintiff has failed to demonstrate how his remainingclaims for consulting services and the provision of office space, equipment and access to hardwareduring the relevant time period would justify restitution beyond their reasonable value so as to requirediscovery of the ongoing nature and profits of defendants' business (see Carlino v Kaplan, 139F Supp 2d 563, 564-565 [2001]).
Peters, J.P., Malone Jr. and Stein, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.[Prior Case History: 25 Misc 3d 1071.]