| Sela v Katz |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 07918 [78 AD3d 681] |
| November 3, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Lisa Sela et al., Appellants, v Lawrence Katz, Defendant, andGood Samaritan Hospital, Respondent. |
—[*1] O'Connor, McGuinness, Conte, Doyle & Oleson, White Plains, N.Y. (Montgomery L. Effinger ofcounsel), for respondent.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for medical malpractice and lack of informed consent,etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Nelson, J.), enteredApril 24, 2009, which granted the motion of the defendant Good Samaritan Hospital for summaryjudgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
On August 4, 1997, the injured plaintiff underwent arthroscopic surgery on her right knee at thefacility of the defendant Good Samaritan Hospital (hereinafter Good Samaritan). The surgery wasperformed by the defendant Dr. Lawrence Katz, the injured plaintiff's private physician. At thecommencement of the surgery, at Dr. Katz's direction, an Ace bandage and a tourniquet inflated to apressure of 300 millimeters of mercury were used to exsanguinate the plaintiff's knee in order to affordDr. Katz an unobscured view of the surgical area. According to medical records, the tourniquet wasdeflated at the conclusion of the surgery, 19 minutes after it was inflated. After the surgery, the injuredplaintiff developed reflex sympathetic dystrophy (hereinafter RSD), which she attributes to excessivepressure of the tourniquet. She, and her husband suing derivatively, commenced this action, inter alia,seeking damages for medical malpractice and lack of informed consent. After discovery wascompleted, Good Samaritan moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as assertedagainst it. The Supreme Court granted the motion, and we affirm.
Good Samaritan established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by presentingevidence in admissible form, inter alia, that Dr. Katz was the defendant's private physician and was notemployed by the hospital, that he did nothing contraindicated by normal practice that would make theoperating room nurse question his orders, and that the operating room staff did not depart from goodand accepted practice with regard to the injured plaintiff's care (see Winegrad v New York Univ.Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557,562 [1980]; Martinez v La Porta, 50AD3d 976, 977 [2008]; Muniz vKatlowitz, 49 AD3d 511, 513-514 [2008]).
In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact. First, "where a private [*2]physician attends his or her patient at the facilities of a hospital, it is theduty of the physician, not the hospital, to obtain the patient's informed consent" (Salandy v Bryk, 55 AD3d 147, 152[2008]; see Sita v Long Is. Jewish-HillsideMed. Ctr., 22 AD3d 743 [2005]), and a hospital employee's undertaking the ministerial taskof recording that consent does not transfer that duty to the hospital (see Cirella v Central Gen.Hosp., 217 AD2d 680, 681 [1995]; cf. Salandy v Bryk, 55 AD3d at 152). The plaintiffsfailed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the hospital actually undertook to obtain the injuredplaintiff's informed consent (see Raschel v Rish, 110 AD2d 1067 [1985]; cf. Salandy v Bryk, 55 AD3d 147[2008]).
Further, hospitals are "shielded from liability when its employees follow the orders of [a private]attending physician unless the latter's orders are so clearly contraindicated by normal practice thatordinary prudence requires inquiry into their correctness" (Filippone v St. Vincent's Hosp. & Med.Ctr. of N.Y., 253 AD2d 616, 618 [1998] [citation omitted]; see Toth v Community Hosp. atGlen Cove, 22 NY2d 255, 265 n 3 [1968]; Muniz v Katlowitz, 49 AD3d at 513; Soto v Andaz, 8 AD3d 470, 471-472[2004]). That was not the situation here (seeSchultz v Shreedhar, 66 AD3d 666, 667 [2009]; Toth v Bloshinsky, 39 AD3d 848, 850 [2007]; Cook v Reisner,295 AD2d 466, 467 [2002]). The plaintiffs did not raise a triable issue of fact as to whether Dr. Katzwas an employee of Good Samaritan (seeDemming v Denk, 48 AD3d 1207, 1209-1210 [2008]; Davenport v County ofNassau, 279 AD2d 497, 498-499 [2001]), or whether Good Samaritan was negligent in affordingDr. Katz privileges (see Boone v NorthShore Univ. Hosp. at Forest Hills, 12 AD3d 338, 339 [2004]; Sledziewski v Cioffi,137 AD2d 186, 189 [1988]).
The plaintiffs' remaining claims are without merit.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted Good Samaritan's motion for summary judgmentdismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. Fisher, J.P., Dillon, Florio and Lott, JJ., concur.