Mooney v City of New York
2010 NY Slip Op 08077 [78 AD3d 795]
November 9, 2010
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, January 19, 2011


Monique Mooney, Appellant,
v
City of New York et al.,Respondents.

—[*1]Ofodile & Associates, P.C., Brooklyn, N.Y. (Anthony C. Ofodile of counsel), forappellant. Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Edward F.X. and DrakeA. Colley of counsel), for respondent City of New York. Harrington, Ocko & Monk, LLP, WhitePlains, N.Y. (I. Paul Howansky of counsel), for respondent Covenant House.

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, aslimited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Flug, J.),dated June 11, 2009, as denied her motion pursuant to CPLR 3404 to restore the action to thetrial calendar.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs.

A plaintiff seeking to restore an action to the trial calendar after it has been dismissedpursuant to CPLR 3404 must demonstrate the existence of a potentially meritorious cause ofaction, a reasonable excuse for the delay in prosecuting the action, a lack of intent to abandon theaction, and a lack of prejudice to the defendant (see Leinas v Long Is. Jewish Med. Ctr., 72 AD3d 905, 906 [2010];Bornstein v Clearview Props., Inc.,68 AD3d 1033, 1034 [2009]; Strancewilko v Martin, 50 AD3d 671 [2008]; M. Parisi & Son Constr. Co., Inc. v LongIs. Obs/Gyn, P.C., 39 AD3d 819, 820 [2007]).

Here, the plaintiff failed to satisfy the four components of this test. Although the plaintiff'sattorney asked the attorneys for both defendants to stipulate to restore the action to the trialcalendar, the correspondence between counsel demonstrates that the defendants' attorneys neveragreed to so stipulate, and there is no indication that a proposed stipulation was ever sent tothem. The record also reveals that even after the attorney for the defendant Covenant Houseadvised the plaintiff's attorney of the need to move to restore the action to the trial calendar, theplaintiff's attorney waited an additional five months before moving to restore the action to thetrial calendar. Under these circumstances, the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a reasonableexcuse for her 17-month delay in prosecuting the action (see Krichmar v Queens Med. Imaging, P.C., 26 AD3d 417, 419[2006]; Costigan v Bleifeld, 21AD3d 871 [2005]).

Furthermore, the only activity which took place in the case between July 2007, [*2]when the case was marked off the trial calendar, and January 2009,when the plaintiff moved to restore, was the service of medical record authorizations. Thislimited activity is insufficient to rebut the presumption of abandonment which attaches when amatter has been automatically dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3404 (see Krichmar v QueensMed. Imaging, P.C., 26 AD3d at 419; Castillo v City of New York, 6 AD3d 568, 569 [2004];Kalyuskin v Rudisel, 306 AD2d 246 [2003]).

The plaintiff also failed to demonstrate the existence of a potentially meritorious cause ofaction against either of the defendants. The plaintiff's contention that this Court's determinationon a prior appeal constitutes law of the case as to the existence of a potentially meritorious causeof action is without merit. This Court's prior determination that the defendants had failed todemonstrate their prima facie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's causeof action to recover damages arising from negligence (see Mooney v City of New York, 27 AD3d 535 [2006]) does notconstitute law of the case establishing that she has a potentially meritorious negligence claim (see J.C. Tarr, Q.P.R.T. v Delsener, 70AD3d 774, 778 [2010]; Meekins vTown of Riverhead, 20 AD3d 399, 400 [2005]; Strouse v United Parcel Serv.,277 AD2d 993, 994 [2000]). Further, the conclusory allegations contained in the plaintiff'saffidavit were insufficient to establish the existence of a potentially meritorious cause of action(see Siculan v Koukos, 74 AD3d946 [2010]; Brownfield vFerris, 49 AD3d 790, 791 [2008]; Koehler v Sei Young Choi, 49 AD3d 504, 505 [2008]; Stewartv Tapps Supermarket, 289 AD2d 561 [2001]).

Finally, since more than nine years passed between the time of the acts complained of andthe motion under review, the defendants would be prejudiced if the action were restored to thetrial calendar (see Karwowski v WonderWorks Constr., 73 AD3d 1133 [2010]; Bornstein v Clearview Props., Inc., 68AD3d at 1035; Krichmar v Queens Med. Imaging, P.C., 26 AD3d at 419; Groudine vDelco Dev. Corp., 286 AD2d 416, 417 [2001]). Mastro, J.P., Balkin, Eng and Hall, JJ.,concur.


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