Diontech Consulting, Inc. v New York City Hous. Auth.
2010 NY Slip Op 08440 [78 AD3d 527]
November 18, 2010
Appellate Division, First Department
As corrected through Wednesday, January 19, 2011


Diontech Consulting, Inc., Appellant,
v
New York City HousingAuthority et al., Respondents, et al., Defendant.

—[*1]King & King, LLP, Long Island City (Peter M. Kutil of counsel), for appellant.

Sonya M. Kaloyanides, New York (Stephen W. Goodman of counsel), for New York CityHousing Authority, respondent.

Hollander & Strauss, LLP, Great Neck (Michael R. Strauss of counsel), for PMS ConstructionManagement Corp., respondent.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Richard B. Lowe, III, J.), entered March 18, 2009,which granted the motions by defendants Housing Authority and PMS Construction Management todismiss the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

After the Housing Authority, as owner, and defendant PMS, as construction manager, entered intoa contract with respect to various capital construction projects, PMS entered into another contract withplaintiff herein, as trade contractor, agreeing to perform roofing and asbestos abatement work at acertain project. PMS subsequently directed plaintiff to proceed with the performance of its work, butlater advised plaintiff that the job had to be temporarily suspended because funding had been delayed.When the funding then became available and PMS notified plaintiff it was about to resume work,plaintiff demanded payment of delay damages, and commenced this action when payment was notforthcoming.

We agree with the motion court's determination that this action is barred by the releases thatplaintiff signed. In that regard, plaintiff has conceded that the project in question was completed by May10, 2007, but in September and November of that year, it executed two documents whereby it foreverreleased, waived and discharged defendants from any and all causes of action, suits, debts, accounts,damages, encumbrances, judgments, claims and demands whatsoever.[FN*]In that respect, it is well settled that absent fraudulent inducement or concealment, misrepresentation,mutual mistake or duress, a valid release that is clear and unambiguous on its face constitutes acomplete bar to an action on a claim that is the subject of the release (see [*2]Littman vMagee, 54 AD3d 14, 17 [2008]; Global Mins. & Metals Corp. v Holme, 35 AD3d 93, 98 [2006], lvdenied 8 NY3d 804 [2007]). However, plaintiff proposes that notwithstanding the arising of itsclaims prior to the execution of the subject releases, the negotiation of a solitary change order on orabout August 14, 2007 somehow indicates that the releases were not intended to encompass paymentfor its supposed extra work.

Although a party may, by its conduct, implicitly recognize that a right to additional payment has notbeen extinguished by the releases in question (see Penava Mech. Corp. v Afgo Mech. Servs., Inc., 71 AD3d 493, 495[2010]; E-J Elec. Installation Co. v BrooklynHistorical Socy., 43 AD3d 642 [2007]), there is simply no course of conduct here that couldconceivably be construed as an acknowledgment by PMS or the Housing Authority of plaintiff's right tofurther payment, inasmuch as the second and third extremely broad releases were signed by plaintiffafter PMS had endeavored to arrange for plaintiff to accept a change order, in August 2007, for workthat had not been performed. Moreover, while the releases are themselves sufficient to require dismissalof this action, dismissal was also warranted by plaintiff's failure to comply with the contractualrequirement for timely notice of its claim, which was a "condition[ ] precedent to suit or recovery"(A.H.A. Gen. Constr. v New York City Hous. Auth., 92 NY2d 20, 30-31 [1998]). Thecontract also prohibited, by its terms, the recovery of delay damages (see Corinno Civetta Constr.Corp. v City of New York, 67 NY2d 297, 309 [1986]), and contrary to plaintiff's argument thatthis matter falls within the exception to the rule favoring the enforceability of no-delay-damages clauses,the delay herein was caused solely by the Housing Authority's lack of funding; it cannot be said thatsuch delay was unforeseeable at the time the agreement was executed, or was so great or unreasonableas to be deemed equivalent to abandonment of the contract (id. at 312).

We have considered plaintiff's remaining arguments and find them unavailing. Concur—Tom,J.P., Andrias, Nardelli, Acosta and DeGrasse, JJ.

Footnotes


Footnote *: It should be noted that another suchrelease was executed by plaintiff in January 2007.


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