| Vaream v Corines |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 08561 [78 AD3d 933] |
| November 16, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Richard Vaream, Appellant, v Christopher Corines et al.,Respondents, et al, Defendants. |
—[*1] Callan, Koster, Brady & Brennan LLP, New York, N.Y. (Michael P. Kandler of counsel), forrespondent Christopher Corines. Bartlett McDonough Bastone & Monaghan, LLP, White Plains, N.Y. (Edward J. Guardaro,Jr., and Terence S. Reynolds of counsel), for respondent Marino Stepancic. Ivone Devine & Jensen, LLP, Lake Success, N.Y. (Brian E. Lee of counsel), for respondentNew York Hospital Medical Center of Queens. Perez & Varvaro, Uniondale, N.Y. (Joseph Varvaro of counsel), for respondent Rego ParkNursing Home.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for medical malpractice and wrongful death, theplaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Nelson, J.), enteredSeptember 30, 2009, which granted the separate motions of the defendants Christopher Corines,Marino Stepancic, New York Hospital Medical Center of Queens, and Rego Park Nursing Home,inter alia, for leave to enter judgment against the plaintiff dismissing the action and denied hiscross motion to vacate the dismissal of the action pursuant to CPLR 3404 and to restore theaction to the trial calendar.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs.
A plaintiff seeking to restore a case to the trial calendar more than one year after it has beenmarked "off," and after it has been dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3404, must demonstrate apotentially meritorious cause of action, a reasonable excuse for the delay in prosecuting theaction, a lack of intent to abandon the action, and a lack of prejudice to the defendants (see Leinas v Long Is. Jewish Med. Ctr.,72 AD3d 905, 906 [2010]; Bornstein v Clearview Props., Inc., 68 AD3d 1033, 1034 [2009];Strancewilko v Martin, 50 AD3d671 [2008]). The plaintiff is required to satisfy all four components of the test before thedismissal can be vacated and the case restored (see M. Parisi & Son Constr. Co., Inc. v Long Is. Obs/Gyn, P.C., 39AD3d 819, 820 [2007]; Krichmar vQueens Med. Imaging, P.C., 26 AD3d 417, 419 [2006]).
Here, the plaintiff failed to meet this burden. The unsubstantiated and conclusory excuse[*2]proffered by the plaintiff's attorney regarding law officefailure was insufficient to excuse the two-year-and-eight-month delay in obtaining an expertaffirmation, or in moving to restore the action after it was automatically dismissed pursuant toCPLR 3404 (see Okun v Tanners,11 NY3d 762 [2008]; Leinas v Long Is. Jewish Med. Ctr., 72 AD3d at 906;Krichmar v Queens Med. Imaging, P.C., 26 AD3d at 419; Dalto v 3660 ParkWantagh Owners, 275 AD2d 296, 297 [2000]; Tate v Peninsula Hosp. Ctr., 255AD2d 503, 504 [1998]). Furthermore, in light of the plaintiff's inactivity regarding the actionduring the more than 1½-year period between a prior attempt to restore the action to thecalendar and his present cross motion to restore, the plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption ofabandonment that attaches when a matter has been automatically dismissed (see Bornstein vClearview Props., Inc., 68 AD3d at 1034; Shah v Carlton Gardens Hous. Co., 286AD2d 432, 433 [2001]; Furniture Vil. v Schoenberger, 283 AD2d 607 [2001]).Moreover, since more than 11 years passed between the time the alleged malpractice occurredand the date of the plaintiff's cross motion under review, the respondents would be prejudiced ifthe action were restored to the trial calendar (see Karwowski v Wonder Works Constr., 73 AD3d 1133 [2010];Leinas v Long Is. Jewish Med. Ctr., 72 AD3d at 906; Krichmar v Queens Med.Imaging, P.C., 26 AD3d at 419).
For these reasons, the Supreme Court also properly granted the respondents' separatemotions, inter alia, for leave to enter judgment against the plaintiff dismissing the action. Mastro,J.P., Florio, Dickerson, Belen and Lott, JJ., concur.