| Nowakowski v Douglas Elliman Realty, LLC |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 08719 [78 AD3d 1033] |
| November 23, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Hubert Nowakowski, Respondent, v Douglas EllimanRealty, LLC, et al., Appellants, et al., Defendants. |
—[*1] Lurie, Ilchert, MacDonnell & Ryan, LLP, New York, N.Y. (The Breakstone Law Firm, P.C.[Jay L.T. Breakstone], of counsel), for respondent.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants Douglas Elliman Realty,LLC, and Kreisel Company, Inc., appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order ofthe Supreme Court, Kings County (Jacobson, J.), dated January 27, 2010, as denied that branchof their cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action pursuantto Labor Law § 240 (1) insofar as asserted against them.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs, and, upon searchingthe record, summary judgment is awarded to the plaintiff on the issue of liability on his cause ofaction pursuant to Labor Law § 240 (1) insofar as asserted against the defendants DouglasElliman Realty, LLC, and Kreisel Company, Inc.
The plaintiff was injured when, in the course of his employment as a porter at a residentialbuilding, he fell from a stepladder which broke while he was in the process of removing a ceilinglight fixture in order to repair it. The Supreme Court, inter alia, denied that branch of theappellants' cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law §240 (1) cause of action insofar as asserted against them.
Labor Law § 240 (1) provides, inter alia, that owners and agents must provide properprotection to workers employed in the "repairing" of a building (see Misseritti v Mark IVConstr. Co., 86 NY2d 487, 491 [1995]). The appellants argue that the plaintiff was engagedin routine maintenance in a nonconstruction, nonrenovation setting when the accident occurredand, thus, that the cause of action based upon Labor Law § 240 (1) should have beendismissed insofar as asserted against them. However, this Court has previously held that theactivity of removing a light fixture so that it can be repaired or replaced is deemed a repair and,thus, falls within the purview of Labor Law § 240 (1) (see Eisenstein v Board of Mgrs.of Oaks at La Tourette Condominium Sections I-IV, 43 AD3d 987 [2007]; Fitzpatrick vState of New York, 25 AD3d 755 [2006]; Piccione v 1165 Park Ave., 258 AD2d 357[1999]; Cook v Presbyterian Homes of W. N.Y., 234 AD2d 906 [1996]; Purdie vCrestwood Lake Hgts. Section 4 Corp., 229 AD2d 523 [1996]). By contrast, where theactivity is more in the nature of routine maintenance, such as when it involves replacingcomponent parts which wear out in the normal course of "wear and [*2]tear," without also removing the fixture, then the provisions ofLabor Law § 240 (1) would not apply (see e.g., Abbatiello v Lancaster StudioAssoc., 3 NY3d 46, 53 [2004]; Esposito v New York City Indus. Dev. Agency, 1NY3d 526 [2003]).
Here, the plaintiff's initial activity regarding the subject light fixture, which took place a fewdays before the subject accident, was in the nature of routine maintenance, since the plaintifftestified at his deposition that he was merely going to replace a light bulb which had apparentlyburnt out. However, the plaintiff's testimony showed that he was engaged in repair work at thetime of the accident, as he testified that he was in the process of removing the light fixture fromthe ceiling so that it could be repaired after realizing that the problem was not merely a burnt outbulb.
Moreover, the fact that the light fixture eventually was repaired by the replacement of acomponent part thereof does not obviate the fact that the fixture had to be removed from theceiling in order to accomplish such repair (see Fitzpatrick v State of New York, 25 AD3d755 [2006]). Further, the evidence showed that the repaired part was not one which regularlywore out in the normal course of "wear and tear" (cf. Esposito v New York City Indus. Dev.Agency, 1 NY3d 526 [2003]; Deoki v Abner Props. Co., 48 AD3d 510 [2008];Gallello v MARJ Distribs., Inc., 50 AD3d 734 [2008]).
Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case, we find that, as a matter of law, theplaintiff was engaged in an activity covered by the provisions of Labor Law § 240 (1).Thus, the appellants were not entitled to summary judgment dismissing that cause of actioninsofar as asserted against them. In addition, since there is no factual dispute to be resolved, it isappropriate to search the record and award summary judgment to the plaintiff on the issue ofliability on his Labor Law § 240 (1) cause of action insofar as asserted against theappellants (see Kinsler v Lu-Four Assoc., 215 AD2d 631 [1995]). Skelos, J.P., Fisher,Santucci and Leventhal, JJ., concur.