| Strough v Incorporated Vil. of W. Hampton Dunes |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 08722 [78 AD3d 1037] |
| November 23, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Scott Strough et al., Respondents, v Incorporated Village ofWest Hampton Dunes et al., Defendants, and FM Dune View Designs, LLC, et al.,Appellants. |
—[*1] Twomey, Latham, Shea, Kelley, Dubin & Quartararo, LLP, Riverhead, N.Y. (David M.Dubin and Amiel S. Gross of counsel), for appellant Lynn Macrone. Windels Marx Lane & Mittendorf, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Delton L. Vandever of counsel),for appellant Spencer Glanz. Cahn & Cahn, LLP, Melville, N.Y. (Richard C. Cahn and Daniel K. Cahn of counsel), forrespondents.
In an action, inter alia, for a judgment declaring that the plaintiffs are the sole owners ofcertain real property located on the shore of Moriches Bay, (1) the defendants FM Dune ViewDesigns, LLC, Fran Moss, VLL, LLC, Arianne V. Amsz, Alexandre N. Amsz, Natalie RoseFusco, Emily J. Russo, Francine Maiorana, 780 Dune Road, LLC, Gene Streim, Ilene Streim,Harvey Gessin, Marilyn Tune Gessin, Claire Vegliante, Ettore Mancini, Laura Fabrizio, StuartSchecter, Michelle Schecter, Michael Rossi, Bernice Rossi, Salvatore Mattoli, Theresa Mattoli,Stanley Vickers, Diane Vickers, Robert A. Nyholm, 684 Dune Road Corp., 682 Dune Road LLC,690 Dune Road LLC, Timothy Monfort, and Susan Monfort appeal, as limited by their brief,from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Whelan, J.), dated February 4,2008, as denied that branch of their motion which was to dismiss the amended complaint insofaras asserted against them on the ground that the plaintiffs' claims are barred by the doctrine ofcollateral estoppel, (2) the defendant Lynn Macrone separately appeals from so much of the sameorder as denied those [*2]branches of her motion which were todismiss the amended complaint insofar as asserted against her on the grounds that the plaintiffs'claims are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel and the plaintiffs failed to join necessaryparties, and (3) the defendant Spencer Glanz separately appeals, as limited by his brief, from somuch of the same order as denied that branch of his motion which was to dismiss the amendedcomplaint insofar as asserted against him on the ground that the plaintiffs' claims are barred bythe doctrine of collateral estoppel.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs payable bythe appellants appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
In October 2006, the Trustees of the Freeholders and Commonality of the Town ofSouthampton (hereinafter the Trustees) and the Town of Southampton (hereinafter the Town)commenced the present action against the Incorporated Village of West Hampton Dunes(hereinafter the Village) and several individuals and entities that own real property located on theshore of Moriches Bay in Suffolk County (hereinafter the Property Owners). In essence, theTrustees and the Town claim that two severe storms in December 1992 and March 1993,respectively, suddenly deposited millions of tons of sand on the bottom of Moriches Bay, whichextended the beachfront property by several hundred feet (hereinafter the disputed land).
Although the Trustees and the Town claim that the disputed land belongs to them because itwas suddenly created by the natural act of avulsion, the Property Owners claim that the disputedland belongs to them because it was slowly created over a long period of time by the naturalprocess of accretion. In August 2010 the Town and the Village resolved their jurisdictionaldispute and the Village withdrew its appeal.
The Property Owners contend that the Supreme Court should have granted those branches oftheir motions which were pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) dismissing the amended complaintinsofar as asserted against them on the ground that the plaintiffs' claims are barred by the doctrineof collateral estoppel based on this Court's decision in Trustees of Freeholders &Commonality of Town of Southampton v Buoninfante (303 AD2d 579 [2003]). InBuoninfante, this Court granted Louis Buoninfante's motion for partial summaryjudgment to the extent of declaring that the northern boundary of his property was ambulatoryand based on the high water mark of Moriches Bay and then remitted the matter to the SupremeCourt, Suffolk County, for a trial to determine the current location of his boundary line.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes a party from relitigating an issue which waspreviously decided against that party, or those in privity, in a proceeding in which there was a fairopportunity to fully litigate the matter (see Ryan v New York Tel. Co., 62 NY2d 494,500 [1984]). In order to invoke the doctrine, two requirements must be met: (1) the identicalissue must have been necessarily decided in the prior action and must be decisive in the presentaction, and (2) the party who is precluded from relitigating the issue must have had a full and fairopportunity to contest the matter in the prior action (see Schwartz v Public Adm'r of Countyof Bronx, 24 NY2d 65, 70 [1969]). The proponent of collateral estoppel has the burden ofdemonstrating that the issue was identical and necessarily decided in the first action, whereas theopposing party has the burden of establishing that there was no full and fair opportunity tolitigate the matter in the prior action (see Kaufman v Eli Lilly & Co., 65 NY2d 449, 456[1985]).
The doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply in the present case because the PropertyOwners failed to satisfy their burden of proving that the issues in this case are identical to thoseraised in Buoninfante, which primarily involved discrepancies in the deeds in the chain oftitle to Louis Buoninfante's property. Furthermore, Buoninfante involved one parcel ofreal property located on the shore of Moriches Bay, whereas the present case involvesapproximately 30 parcels of real property in the vicinity, which may or may not have beenaffected in the same fashion or to the same degree by the natural processes of accretion oravulsion. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court properly declined to apply the doctrineof collateral estoppel (see Davidson v American Bio Medica Corp., 299 AD2d 390[2002]; Kristensen v Charleston Sq., 295 AD2d 404 [2002]; Reiss v Maynard,129 AD2d 999 [1987]).[*3]
In addition, the Supreme Court properly denied thatbranch of Lynn Macrone's motion which was to dismiss the amended complaint insofar asasserted against her on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to join all necessary parties. Where, ashere, complete relief may be accorded between the parties and the absent parties will not beinequitably affected by a judgment in the action, the absentees are not deemed to be necessaryparties (see CPLR 1001 [a]; Matter of Figari v New York Tel. Co., 32 AD2d 434,439 [1969]). Dillon, J.P., Santucci, Dickerson and Chambers, JJ., concur.