| People v Hicks |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 08752 [78 AD3d 1075] |
| November 23, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v NoelHicks, Appellant. |
—[*1] Kathleen M. Rice, District Attorney, Mineola, N.Y. (Andrea M. DiGregorio, Sarah Abeles,and Gazeena Soni of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Grella, J.),rendered June 15, 2009, convicting him of burglary in the second degree (three counts), criminalpossession of stolen property in the fourth degree, criminal possession of stolen property in thefifth degree, petit larceny, and criminal mischief in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, andimposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing pursuant to astipulation in lieu of motions, of the suppression of identification testimony and physicalevidence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
We reject the defendant's contention that the Supreme Court erred in denying suppression ofthe showup identification made by the complainant near the scene of the crime. While showupprocedures are generally disfavored, they are permissible where, as in this case, they areemployed in close spatial and temporal proximity to the commission of the crime for the purposeof securing a prompt and reliable identification (see People v Duuvon, 77 NY2d 541[1991]; People v Grassia, 195 AD2d 607 [1993]). The fact that the defendant was in thecompany of the police did not render the showup constitutionally infirm (see People vGrassia, 195 AD2d at 607; People v McLamb, 140 AD2d 717 [1988]).
Moreover, the record supports the Supreme Court's determination that the police hadreasonable suspicion to stop and detain the defendant based upon the description, broadcast topolice units, of the perpetrator of a burglary, which matched the defendant's description, his closeproximity to the site of the crime, and the short passage of time between the crime and theshowup (see People v Mais, 71 AD3d 1163 [2010]; People v Green, 10 AD3d664 [2004]; see also People v Blak, 6 AD3d 301 [2004]; People v Ferguson, 5AD3d 250 [2004]; People v Bell, 5 AD3d 804 [2004]; People v Holland, 4 AD3d375 [2004]).
Additionally, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying thedefendant's motion, on the eve of trial, for an adjournment to review Rosario material(see People v Rosario, 9 NY2d 286 [1961], cert denied 368 US 866 [1961]).Since there was timely disclosure of the material, the Supreme Court reasonably concluded thatthe defendant had ample [*2]time to review it, and that his motionwas a dilatory tactic (see generally People v Winslow, 222 AD2d 722 [1995]).
The defendant's remaining contentions contained in points one and three of his brief arewithout merit. Rivera, J.P., Leventhal, Hall and Roman, JJ., concur.