| People v Duncan |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 08956 [78 AD3d 1193] |
| November 30, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v De'Quan Duncan, Appellant. |
—[*1] Janet DiFiore, District Attorney, White Plains, N.Y. (William C. Milaccio and RichardLongworth Hecht of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Adler,J.), rendered August 13, 2009, convicting him of murder in the second degree, upon his plea ofguilty, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Prior to sentencing, the defendant moved to withdraw his plea of guilty, asserting that he wasinnocent and that he was coerced by his attorney to plead guilty. The defendant contends that theSupreme Court erred in denying his motion.
The decision to permit a defendant to withdraw a previously entered plea of guilty restswithin the sound discretion of the court and generally will not be disturbed absent an improvidentexercise of discretion (see CPL 220.60 [3]; People v Seeber, 4 NY3d 780 [2005];People v Haffiz, 77 AD3d 767 [2010]; People v Villalobos, 71 AD3d 924 [2010];People v Pooler, 58 AD3d 757 [2009]). The defendant's contention that certainstatements he made to law enforcement officials cast doubt upon his guilt and rendered his pleafactually insufficient is unpreserved for appellate review because he did not raise this contentionin his motion to withdraw his plea of guilty (see People v Clarke, 93 NY2d 904, 906[1999]; People v Lopez, 71 NY2d 662, 665-666 [1988]; People v Villalobos, 71AD3d at 924). In any event, the defendant's contentions regarding his innocence and ajustification defense are unsupported by the record and do not afford a basis for withdrawal of hisplea of guilty (see People v Alexander, 97 NY2d 482, 485 [2002]; People vDixon, 29 NY2d 55, 57 [1971]; People v Tinsley, 32 AD3d 447 [2006]). The factualportion of the plea allocution did not negate any essential element of the crime and, thus, theSupreme Court was under no duty to inquire further (cf. People v Lopez, 71 NY2d at667-668).
The defendant's acceptance of the plea offer was an informed choice, freely made amongvalid alternatives, and he entered his plea of guilty voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently(see People v Fiumefreddo, 82 NY2d 536, 543 [1993]; People v Harris, 61 NY2d9, 16-17 [1983]; cf. People v Brown, 14 NY3d 113, 116 [2010]). The defendant's claimof coercion is belied by his statements under oath on the record [*2]expressing satisfaction with his attorney's representation andacknowledging that no one had coerced his plea (see People v Turner, 23 AD3d 503,503-504 [2005]; People v Raymond, 3 AD3d 587 [2004]). The Supreme Court properlyrejected the defendant's contentions that his attorney pressured him into pleading guilty (seePeople v Dixon, 29 NY2d at 57; People v Wiedmer, 71 AD3d 1067 [2010];People v Mirecki, 63 AD3d 1089 [2009]; People v Tinsley, 32 AD3d 447 [2006];People v Elting, 18 AD3d 770, 771 [2005]). As there was no legitimate question as to thevoluntariness of the plea, the Supreme Court providently denied the motion without conductingan evidentiary hearing (see People v Brown, 14 NY3d at 116; People v Tinsley,35 NY2d 926, 927 [1974]; People v Smith, 54 AD3d 879, 880 [2008]). Mastro, J.P.,Covello, Angiolillo and Lott, JJ., concur.