Matter of EchoStar Satellite Corp. v Tax Appeals Trib. of the State ofN.Y.
2010 NY Slip Op 09039 [79 AD3d 1307]
December 9, 2010
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, February 16, 2011


In the Matter of EchoStar Satellite Corporation, Petitioner, v TaxAppeals Tribunal of the State of New York et al., Respondents.

—[*1]Morrison & Foerster, L.L.P., New York City (Paul H. Frankel of counsel), for petitioner.

Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General, Albany (Andrew D. Bing of counsel), for Commissioner ofTaxation and Finance, respondent.

Mercure, J.P. Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (initiated in this Court pursuant to Tax Law§ 2016) to review a determination of respondent Tax Appeals Tribunal which sustained thedenial of a sales and use tax refund.

Petitioner is a provider of satellite television programming that conducts business under the name"Dish Network." During the relevant time frame, petitioner purchased equipment needed to providesuch programming from manufacturers and supplied the equipment to its customers for a monthly feethat was bundled within its programming charge. Petitioner did not pay sales tax on its purchases of theequipment.

Following an audit, the Department of Taxation and Finance concluded that petitioner's equipmentpurchases were subject to sales and use tax, and issued a notice of determination assessingapproximately $1.8 million in taxes on those purchases for the tax periods March 1, 2000 throughFebruary 29, 2004. Petitioner paid the tax assessed under protest, but sought a refund on the groundthat its equipment purchases constituted nontaxable purchases "for resale as [*2]such" (Tax Law § 1101 [b] [4] [i] [A]) because the equipmentwas rented to its customers. Rentals are included in the definition of "sale" (Tax Law § 1101 [5]).Following a hearing, an administrative law judge sustained the notice of determination and, upon appeal,respondent Tax Appeals Tribunal affirmed.[FN*]This proceeding ensued.

Petitioner asserts that its equipment purchases were exempt from sales tax as "purchases forresale," and challenges the Tribunal's determination to the contrary. Specifically, petitioner argues thatthe Tribunal erred in concluding that petitioner leased the equipment to its customers solely as anincident to its primary business of providing satellite television programming—a nontaxableservice—rather than purchasing the equipment "for resale as such." Petitioner maintains that itwas entitled to the exemption because the equipment retained its separate identity as equipment whenleased to customers and it was leased for a designated charge on which its customers paid sales tax.Therefore, petitioner contends, the equipment was not inseparably connected with or incidental to theprovision of satellite programming. We disagree.

"As a party seeking the benefit of a statutory exemption to the imposition of sales tax, petitioner hadthe burden of establishing that its purchases fell within the meaning of the statutory resale exemption inthat the items purchased were purchased for the singular purpose of resale" (Matter of West Val.Nuclear Servs. Co. v Tax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y., 264 AD2d 101, 102-103 [2000], lvdenied 95 NY2d 760 [2000]; see Tax Law § 1132 [c] [1]; Matter of 21 Club, Inc. v Tax Appeals Trib. ofState of N.Y., 69 AD3d 996, 997 [2010]; Matter of Helmsley Enters. v Tax AppealsTrib. of State of N.Y., 187 AD2d 64, 70 [1993], lv denied 81 NY2d 710 [1993]). Ourreview of the Tribunal's decision that petitioner did not rent the equipment—and thereby resell itto customers within the meaning of the statute—is limited to determining whether that decision isirrational or unreasonable (see e.g. Matter of Galileo Intl. Partnership v Tax Appeals Trib. of Dept.of Taxation & Fin. of State of N.Y., 31 AD3d 1072, 1074 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d715 [2006]; Matter of West Val. Nuclear Servs. Co. v Tax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y.,264 AD2d at 103). Moreover, "[g]reat deference is given to the [Tribunal's] characterization of thetransaction" (Matter of Midland Asphalt Corp. v Chu, 136 AD2d 851, 853 [1988], lvdenied 72 NY2d 806 [1988]) inasmuch as "[i]t should not fall within judicial 'decisional analysis' todetermine what is or is not a rental" (Matter of Albany Calcium Light Co. v State Tax Commn.,44 NY2d 986, 988 [1978]; see generally Matter of American Tel. & Tel. Co. v State TaxCommn., 61 NY2d 393, 400 [1984]).

As noted by the Tribunal, an item is purchased for resale within the meaning of the statute when thepurchaser "acquires [the] item for the purpose of sale or rental" (Matter of Albany CalciumLight Co. v State Tax Commn., 44 NY2d at 987 [emphasis added]; see Matter of West Val.Nuclear Servs. Co. v Tax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y., 264 AD2d at 103; Matter ofCustom Mgt. Corp. v New York State Tax Commn., 148 AD2d 919, 920 [1989]). In our view,the Tribunal rationally determined that petitioner did not acquire the equipment for the [*3]purpose of rental to its customers. Rather, as the Tribunal concluded,petitioner's primary purpose is to provide satellite television service and it used the equipment to supplythat service to its customers.

Indeed, petitioner's witness, senior accounting manager Timothy Beggs, testified that customerswishing to receive petitioner's service were required to either purchase or lease the equipment frompetitioner. Customers could not use the equipment to obtain satellite television service from any otherproviders, and the equipment had no use apart from receiving petitioner's programming service.Petitioner repossessed the equipment when programming service terminated—not whenequipment rental terminated. At that point it would retire the equipment as an asset on its books until itwas "redeployed." Under these circumstances, the equipment "was provided as a part of petitioner'sservices and . . . the additional charge [in its monthly bills] was merely an 'add-on' for theuse of the equipment, not a true rental" (Matter of Midland Asphalt Corp. v Chu, 136 AD2d at853; see Matter of 21 Club, Inc. v Tax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y., 69 AD3d at 997).That is, the equipment was "purely incidental" and "inseparably connected to petitioner's essentialbusiness" of providing satellite television programming "and, therefore, furnishing those items cannot beconsidered separate transactions for sales tax purposes" (Matter of Helmsley Enters. v TaxAppeals Trib. of State of N.Y., 187 AD2d at 69 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted];cf. Matter of Burger King v State Tax Commn., 51 NY2d 614, 622-623 [1980]; Matterof Galileo Intl. Partnership v Tax Appeals Trib. of Dept. of Taxation & Fin. of State of N.Y., 31AD3d at 1074-1075).

Petitioner's remaining arguments are either unpreserved or, upon consideration, have been found tolack merit.

Peters, Rose, Malone Jr. and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination is confirmed,without costs, and petition dismissed.

Footnotes


Footnote *: Consistent with its position that theequipment was purchased for rental to its customers, petitioner billed, collected andremitted—erroneously in the Department's view—approximately $2 million in sales anduse taxes on the equipment fees paid by its customers. Petitioner's request for a refund of this moneywas denied because petitioner had not repaid these funds to its customers.


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