Matter of Nygard v County of Warren
2010 NY Slip Op 09060 [79 AD3d 1354]
December 9, 2010
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, February 16, 2011


In the Matter of Thomas Nygard, Petitioner, v County of Warren et al.,Respondents.

—[*1]Gleason, Dunn, Walsh & O'Shea, Albany (Ronald G. Dunn of counsel), for petitioner. PatriciaC. Nenninger, County Attorney, Lake George, for respondents.

Lahtinen, J. Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of theSupreme Court, entered in Warren County) to review a determination of respondent Warren CountySheriff which terminated petitioner's employment.

In January 2009, petitioner, a correction officer with respondent Warren County Sheriff's Office,called in sick for his 2:30 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. shift. Later that evening, he went to a local bar where heencountered a group of coworkers including two officers and a sergeant. The sergeant had beeninvolved one day earlier in a canine sniff of the exterior of vehicles parked at the Warren CountyCorrectional Facility, which had resulted in an alert for petitioner's vehicle and, upon his consentedsearch, discovery of a small, unidentified leaf. Petitioner approached the sergeant at the bar, called hima derogatory name, described the canine search in similar terms and continued with disparagingremarks directed at the sergeant while moving physically very close until the sergeant walked away.During the course of that same evening, petitioner reportedly challenged one of the officers to a fist fightseveral times. He grabbed the officer on one occasion and told him that he liked to fight when he drank.[*2]

Shortly thereafter, petitioner was served with a notice ofadministrative inquiry and, on January 28, 2009, he attended the inquiry with a union representative.The lieutenant conducting the inquiry questioned petitioner regarding the canine search, his calling insick, and whether he consumed alcohol at the bar the night of the incident. When the questioning turnedto what had transpired with his coworkers at the bar, petitioner called an attorney and then refused toanswer any further questions despite the lieutenant's warning that he could face discipline for suchrefusal.

The Sheriff's Office soon commenced a disciplinary proceeding against petitioner, which resulted ina hearing pursuant to Civil Service Law § 75 on seven charges of misconduct. The HearingOfficer recommended that four of the charges be sustained and, when those charges were consideredtogether with another recent disciplinary matter involving petitioner, the Hearing Officer recommendedthat petitioner's employment be terminated. Respondent Nathan H. York, the Warren County Sheriff,modified the Hearing Officer's recommendations to the extent of finding that the record supportedsustaining one additional charge (five total). Petitioner's employment was terminated and this proceedingensued.

Petitioner initially argues that respondents violated his statutory rights by refusing his request, madepart way through the administrative inquiry, to adjourn until he could have an attorney present, and that,as a result, all information gleaned at the inquiry should have been excluded from the subsequentdisciplinary proceeding. Civil Service Law § 75 (2) establishes two levels of representationdependent on the stage of the proceedings. The first sentence of subdivision (2) provides that duringquestioning of an employee who "appears to be a potential subject of disciplinary action," the employeehas a right to have a union representative present. And, as stated near the middle of subdivision (2), thefailure to afford this right results in exclusion at the disciplinary hearing of statements and evidence fromthe initial questioning (see Matter of NewYork City Tr. Auth. v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 8 NY3d 226, 233-234[2007]; Matter of Ernst v Saratoga County, 234 AD2d 764, 766-767 [1996]). However,when the matter moves to the second stage with filed disciplinary charges and a scheduled hearing, thelatter part of subdivision (2) expands the right of representation to also include an attorney. In thecurrent case, the administrative inquiry constituted stage one questioning and petitioner wasaccompanied to the inquiry by a union representative. This reflects compliance with the statutoryrequirement and the record reveals no violation of proper procedures.

Next, we are unpersuaded by petitioner's contention that his off-duty conduct was improperlyconsidered as a basis for discipline. An employee may be disciplined for actions occurring whileoff-duty (see Villanueva v Simpson, 69 NY2d 1034, 1035 [1987]). Petitioner was required tocomply with a Sheriff's Office regulation that pertained to off-duty conduct and, moreover, his conductof berating a superior officer in public and attempting to instigate a fist fight with another officer in apublic place constituted conduct for which an off-duty officer can be subject to discipline (seeMatter of Petry v Constantine, 210 AD2d 866, 867 [1994]; Matter of Pollett vMcGourty, 111 AD2d 1023, 1024 [1985]).

Substantial evidence supported each of the charges sustained by the Sheriff. It was within theprovince of the Hearing Officer to credit the testimony of the several Sheriff's Office employees whotestified (see Matter of Perryman v Village ofSaranac Lake, 64 AD3d 830, 835 [2009]). Their testimony established, among other things,that petitioner berated and made derogatory statements in public to a superior officer, repeatedlyattempted to engage another officer in a fist fight, failed to [*3]answertruthfully when asked at the administrative inquiry whether he had consumed alcoholic beverages thenight of the incident, and refused to answer questions at the inquiry despite being informed of hisprotection from prosecution and the consequences for failing to answer.

Finally, petitioner's challenge to the penalty is unavailing. Our review is limited to whether thepenalty is "so disproportionate as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness" (Matter of Collins vParishville-Hopkinton Cent. School Dist., 274 AD2d 732, 734 [2000]). The penalty does not riseto that level given the nature of the charges sustained, particularly when considered together with thefact that only a few months earlier petitioner had been disciplined for another off-duty alcohol-relatedincident.

Cardona, P.J., Rose, Malone Jr. and McCarthy, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination isconfirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.


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