| People v Rush |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 09571 [79 AD3d 1522] |
| December 30, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Rodney Rush,Appellant. |
—[*1] Nicole M. Duve, District Attorney, Canton (Victoria M. Esposito of counsel), forrespondent.
Malone Jr., J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of St. Lawrence County (Nicandri, J.),rendered May 25, 2004, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of assault in thesecond degree.
Defendant, a prison inmate, injured a correction officer during an altercation and was charged withassault in the second degree. He pleaded guilty to that crime and was sentenced to five years in prisonto be followed by five years of postrelease supervision. Although the conviction was originally affirmedby this Court (People v Rush, 50 AD3d1246 [2008]), we subsequently granted defendant's motion for a writ of error coram nobis,vacated our earlier decision and reinstated his appeal. In doing so, we permitted defendant to challengethe sufficiency of his plea allocution and the voluntariness of his plea.
Earlier on the day he entered his plea—following extensive discussions regarding apotentially agreeable sentence—defendant maintained his innocence and stated his unwillingnessto "participate in [a] railroad job." He thereafter waived his right to be present in the courtroom. Duringthe ensuing jury selection process, County Court received a note indicating that defendant "is tellingholding cell officers that he is diabetic and wants medical attention." After a test of defendant's bloodsugar revealed levels in the "low but normal" range, defense counsel informed County Court thatdefendant, "having relieved himself of that stress and had some time to [*2]reflect," was willing to enter a guilty plea to the proposed disposition thathad been discussed earlier that morning. Notably, the record reveals that defendant requested to speakprivately with his attorney and initiated the renewed plea discussions himself.
Upon his return to the court room, defendant and County Court engaged in a detailed pleacolloquy during which defendant verified that he had not been threatened and was entering the guiltyplea voluntarily, confirmed that he had ample time to discuss the plea and its consequences with hisattorney, and acknowledged that he understood the rights he was relinquishing. While also indicatingthat he had recently taken insulin, defendant nonetheless stated that he was "fully aware of what [was]going on around [him]." County Court then ascertained that defendant had been confined to acorrectional facility when the incident occurred—an element of the crime charged (seePenal Law § 120.05 [7]). As to the remaining elements, defendant stated that he did not intendto injure the correction officer and that he was acting in self-defense.
Clearly, such statements cast doubt on defendant's guilt and negated an essential element of thecrime, thus triggering County Court's duty to ensure that defendant understood the nature of the chargeand that he was intelligently entering the plea (see People v Lopez, 71 NY2d 662, 666[1988]). Upon our review of the record, we are persuaded that County Court satisfied its responsibilityin this regard. In response to County Court's immediate follow-up inquiry, defense counsel indicatedthat defendant was aware that facts at a trial might show that defendant, while being carried by fourcorrection officers, kicked and injured one of the four. More specifically, defense counsel stated thatdefendant "believes if the matter went to trial there is a very good possibility that the jury could find himguilty on those facts, that intent—which is a silent operation of the mind—could beproven." County Court then sought and received affirmation of defense counsel's statements fromdefendant and verified that the correction officer's injury satisfied statutory requirements beforeaccepting defendant's guilty plea.
In our view, particularly given defendant's "positive confirmation of his lawyer's exposition"(People v Nixon, 21 NY2d 338, 350 [1967]), the foregoing is reflective of a knowing,voluntary and intelligent guilty plea (see People v Haldeos, 248 AD2d 804, 804-805 [1998]).Indeed, "defendant, represented by counsel and no novice to the criminal justice system, clearlyunderstood the nature of the charges to which he was pleading and willingly entered his plea to obtainthe benefit of the bargain he had struck" (People v Goldstein, 12 NY3d 295, 301 [2009]).
We have considered defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be unpersuasive.
Cardona, P.J., Mercure, Stein and Garry, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.