| Schley v Steffans |
| 2010 NY Slip Op 09734 [79 AD3d 1753] |
| December 30, 2010 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| Jeralyn Schley, Appellant, v Ryen Steffans et al.,Respondents. |
—[*1] Hagelin Kent LLC, Buffalo (Victor M. Wright of counsel), for defendant-respondent RonaldLaraba.
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Tracey A. Bannister, J.), enteredJuly 22, 2009 in a personal injury action. The order denied the motion of plaintiff to set aside averdict pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a).
It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for injuries she sustainedwhen the motor vehicle driven by her daughter, defendant Ryen Steffans, and in which plaintiffwas a passenger, collided with a vehicle driven by defendant Ronald Laraba. Following a trial onliability, the jury concluded that Steffans' negligence was a proximate cause of the accident andthat, although Laraba was negligent, such negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident.Plaintiff appeals from an order denying her post-trial motion to set aside the verdict asinconsistent and against the weight of the evidence and for a new trial. We affirm.
Plaintiff contends that the verdict is inconsistent and against the weight of the evidencebecause it was logically impossible to find that Laraba was negligent without also finding thatsuch negligence was a proximate cause of the accident. "Plaintiff failed to preserve for ourreview [her] contention that the verdict is inconsistent because [she] did not object to the verdicton that ground before the jury was discharged" (Delong v County of Chautauqua [appealNo. 2], 71 AD3d 1580, 1581 [2010]). In any event, we conclude that the verdict is neitherinconsistent nor against the weight of the evidence. "A jury finding that a party was negligent butthat such negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident is inconsistent and against theweight of the evidence only when the issues are so inextricably interwoven as to make it logicallyimpossible to find negligence without also finding proximate cause" (Skowronski v Mordino, 4 AD3d782, 783 [2004] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Potter v Jay E. Potter Lbr. Co., Inc., 71 AD3d 1565, 1567[2010]). A driver " 'who has the right of way[, such as Laraba,] is entitled to anticipate that othervehicles will obey the traffic laws that require them to yield' . . . In addition, [he][*2]has 'no duty to watch for and avoid a driver who might fail tostop or to proceed with due caution at a stop sign' " (Doxtader v Janczuk, 294 AD2d 859,859-860 [2002], lv denied 99 NY2d 505 [2003]). Thus, we conclude that "the evidenceon the issue of causation [with respect to Laraba] did not so preponderate in favor of plaintiff thatthe jury's finding of no proximate cause could not have been reached on any fair interpretation ofthe evidence" (Waild v Boulos [appeal No. 2], 2 AD3d 1284, 1286 [2003], lv denied2 NY3d 703 [2004]; see Lolik v Big V Supermarkets, 86 NY2d 744, 746 [1995]).Present—Martoche, J.P., Smith, Fahey, Peradotto and Green, JJ.