Bazoyah v Herschitz
2010 NY Slip Op 09875 [79 AD3d 1081]
December 28, 2010
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, February 16, 2011


Alvard Bazoyah, Appellant,
v
Izak Herschitz et al.,Respondents.

[*1]Harmon, Linder & Rogowsky, New York, N.Y. (Mitchell Dranow of counsel), forappellant. Andrea G. Sawyers, Melville, N.Y. (Christopher T. Vetro of counsel), forrespondents.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order ofthe Supreme Court, Nassau County (Lally, J.), dated October 16, 2009, which granted thedefendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and denied her cross motionpursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1) to vacate an order of the same court dated July 16, 2009, grantingthe defendants' unopposed motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 to preclude her from offering evidenceat trial.

Ordered that the order dated October 16, 2009, is affirmed, with costs.

To vacate her default in opposing the defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3126, theplaintiff was required to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for her default and a potentiallymeritorious opposition to the motion (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Campbell-Jarvis v Alves, 68 AD3d701 [2009]; Nowell v NYU Med.Ctr., 55 AD3d 573 [2008]; Raciti v Sands Point Nursing Home, 54 AD3d 1014 [2008]; Simpson v Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A.,Inc., 48 AD3d 389, 392 [2008]). While "[t]he court has discretion to accept law-officefailure as a reasonable excuse . . . 'a pattern of willful default and neglect' shouldnot be excused" (Roussodimou v Zafiriadis, 238 AD2d 568, 569 [1997] [citationsomitted], quoting Gannon v Johnson Scale Co., 189 AD2d 1052, 1052 [1993]; seePollock v Meltzer, 78 AD3d 677 [2d Dept 2010]; Campbell-Jarvis v Alves, 68 AD3d 701 [2009]). Here, theplaintiff's failure to comply with court-ordered discovery, her default in opposing the defendants'motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 to preclude her from offering evidence at trial, and her failure toappear for the duly-scheduled certification conference on July 8, 2009, constituted a pattern ofwillful default and neglect that cannot be excused (see Grippi v Balkan Sewer & Water Main Serv., 66 AD3d 837, 838[2009]; Santiago v New York CityHealth & Hosps. Corp., 10 AD3d 393, 394 [2004]; Kolajo v City of New York,248 AD2d 512 [1998]). Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to establish that she had a potentiallymeritorious opposition to the defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 (see Horne v Swimquip, Inc., 36 AD3d859, 861 [2007]; Sowerby vCamarda, 20 AD3d 411 [2005]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied theplaintiff's cross motion pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1) to vacate the prior order of preclusion.[*2]

The Supreme Court also properly granted the defendants'motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, since the preclusion order prevents theplaintiff from establishing a prima facie case (see Panagiotou v Samaritan Vil., Inc., 66 AD3d 979 [2009]; Calder v Cofta, 49 AD3d 484, 485[2008]; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.v Hertz Corp., 43 AD3d 907, 908 [2007]).

In light of our determination, we need not reach the plaintiff's remaining contention. Dillon,J.P., Balkin, Chambers and Sgroi, JJ., concur.


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