Matter of Green (Village of Hempstead\MCommissioner ofLabor)
2011 NY Slip Op 00137 [80 AD3d 954]
January 13, 2011
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, March 9, 2011


In the Matter of the Claim of Donna M. Green, Respondent. Villageof Hempstead, Appellant. Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.

—[*1]Bond, Schoeneck & King, P.L.L.C., Garden City (Debra Urbano-DiSalvo of counsel),for appellant.

McNamee, Lochner, Titus & Williams, P.C., Albany (Francis J. Smith of counsel), forDonna M. Green, respondent.

Garry, J. Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed July29, 2009, which, among other things, ruled that claimant was entitled to receive unemploymentinsurance benefits.

Claimant was discharged from her employment in September 2005 after working for theemployer as a Deputy Village Attorney for 12 years. The Department of Labor denied her claimfor unemployment insurance benefits, finding that she had been discharged for misconduct. Atclaimant's request, a hearing was scheduled in March 2006, but claimant did not appear. AnAdministrative Law Judge (hereinafter ALJ) entered a default judgment sustaining thedetermination. In July 2008, claimant applied to reopen the claim. The ALJ denied theapplication following a hearing, finding the delay in making the request unreasonable. Uponclaimant's appeal, the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board determined that claimant wasentitled to reopen the claim, that her request for the hearing had not been untimely, and that thecredible evidence established no disqualifying misconduct on her part. Accordingly, the Boardoverruled the Department's initial determination and ruled that claimant was entitled to receive[*2]unemployment benefits. The employer appeals.

Whether to grant an application to reopen a decision is within the Board's discretion(see 12 NYCRR 463.6 [a]; Matter of Maymi [Commissioner of Labor], 42 AD3d 845, 846[2007]). When a party demonstrates a reasonable excuse for a default, it is not an abuse of theBoard's discretion to grant the party's application to reopen a default decision (see Matter ofAlbanese [Commissioner of Labor], 304 AD2d 945, 946 [2003]; see also 12 NYCRR461.8). The Board found a reasonable excuse for claimant's default at the March 2006 hearingbased upon her testimony that she called the Department before the hearing date to request anadjournment because her witness was unavailable and was told that she could wait severalmonths to recalendar the matter. She further testified that she did not receive a copy of the defaultdecision and was advised by the Department in late 2006 that the matter could still be reopened.The determination that this testimony was credible was within the Board's province (see Matter of Brown [Commissioner ofLabor], 4 AD3d 604 [2004]). As for claimant's subsequent delay in applying to reopenthe claim, the default decision specifically granted claimant leave to reopen "within a reasonabletime." While the Board made no explicit findings in this respect, there is recordevidence—including claimant's uncontradicted testimony that she applied to reopen afterlearning that the employer was advising prospective employers that she had been discharged formisconduct—from which it could have found that claimant acted within a reasonable timeor showed good cause for her failure to do so. Accordingly, we do not find an abuse of theBoard's discretion in reopening the case.

The employer next contends that the ALJ lacked jurisdiction to review the Department'sinitial determination because claimant did not request the March 2006 hearing within 30 daysafter the determination was mailed (see Labor Law § 620 [1] [a]; Matter of Davis [Commissioner ofLabor], 76 AD3d 1136 [2010]). The initial determination was mailed to claimant inDecember 2005. She testified that she received it within 30 days thereafter in January 2006, andmailed her request on that same date. The Board accepted this testimony and found the request,bearing the date on which claimant allegedly mailed it, to be timely, although the Department didnot receive it until several weeks later. The credibility of this testimony again posed an issue forthe Board to resolve (see Matter of Hedo[New York City Dept. of Personnel—Commissioner of Labor], 19 AD3d 985,985 [2005]; Matter of Schwartz [DurhonOldham Natl. Income Life—Commissioner of Labor], 17 AD3d 903, 903-904[2005]), and we will not disturb its determination.

The employer further asserts that the credible evidence established that claimant wasdischarged for conducting her private legal practice on the employer's time, and that herdischarge was not, as she claimed, merely politically motivated. Whether an employee wasterminated for misconduct is a factual question for the Board to resolve, and its resolution of thisissue will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence (see Matter of Ponce [Commissioner ofLabor], 75 AD3d 1041, 1041 [2010]; Matter of Kuryla [Finger Lakes Community Coll.—Commissioner ofLabor], 45 AD3d 1129, 1130 [2007]). The employer submitted three memoranda toclaimant from her supervisor in support of the claimed misconduct. Claimant testified that shehad received only one of these three documents prior to her termination, and she refuted theclaims stated within the documents. Claimant also submitted testimony of two witnessessupporting her claim that she and other members of the legal staff were discharged for politicalreasons following the election of a new mayor, and the employer did not offer evidence refutingthis testimony. Upon reviewing the conflicting evidence, we note that claimant's occasionalreceipt of private legal mail at the employer's office, standing alone, [*3]did not conclusively establish that she conducted her privatepractice on the employer's time. There was no other evidence of wrongdoing; tardiness on oneoccasion does not necessarily constitute disqualifying misconduct (see e.g. Matter of Massucci [BlackmanPlumbing Supply—Commissioner of Labor], 8 AD3d 737, 737-738 [2004]), evenif claimant's explanation was inaccurate. Thus, substantial evidence supports the Board'sconclusion that claimant did not engage in disqualifying misconduct and was entitled tounemployment insurance benefits.

Finally, the employer's contention that the Board acted improperly in failing to consider anopposing submission by the employer is without merit. The record establishes that neither partysubmitted any "statements, documents or briefs" within the seven-day period allowed (12NYCRR 463.1 [f] [3]) following either the initial notice of receipt of appeal in March 2009 orthe amended notice in July 2009. The evidence submitted by the employer on this issue is notproperly before the Court, since it is outside the record (see Gagen v Kipany Prods., 289AD2d 844, 845 [2001]), but, in any event, does not demonstrate that the Board considered anysubmission by either party.

Spain, J.P., Lahtinen, Kavanagh and Stein, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is affirmed,without costs.


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