| People v Davis |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 00254 [80 AD3d 494] |
| January 18, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v JacquelineDavis, Appellant. |
—[*1] Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Amyjane Rettew of counsel), forrespondent.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Ronald A. Zweibel, J., at motions; Arlene D.Goldberg, J., at jury trial and sentence), rendered April 29, 2010, convicting defendant of forgery in thesecond degree (nine counts), grand larceny in the fourth degree and falsifying business records in thefirst degree, and sentencing her to an aggregate term of 30 days, with five years' probation andrestitution in the amount of $1,025, unanimously affirmed.
The verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence(see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d342, 348-349 [2007]). There is no basis for disturbing the jury's credibility determinations. Theevidence refuted defendant's assertion that she had permission to sign another person's name to thewithdrawal slips at issue. The evidence also supported inferences that defendant used these forged slipsto obtain money for herself, and that she caused the making of false entries in business records.
The court properly denied defendant's speedy trial motion. The period from July 2 to July 16, 2009was excludable as a delay resulting from pretrial motions, including "the period during which suchmatters are under consideration by the court" (CPL 30.30 [4] [a]). The People's delay in producinggrand jury minutes was reasonable (see People v Harris, 82 NY2d 409, 413 [1993]); in anyevent, during the same period the court was also considering a consolidation motion that did not involvegrand jury minutes. The period from July 30 to September 17, 2009, was excludable as a reasonabletime to prepare after the court's decision on motions (see People v Green, 90 AD2d 705[1982], lv denied 58 NY2d 784 [1982]), thus constituting "a reasonable period of delayresulting from . . . pre-trial motions" within the meaning of CPL 30.30 (4) (a). In anyevent, the last three weeks of this period were excludable for the separate reason that they weregranted at defense counsel's request (CPL 30.30 [4] [b]), where defense counsel actively participatedin setting the date and sought a longer adjournment for his own convenience (see e.g. People vMatthews, 227 AD2d 313 [1996], lv denied 88 NY2d 989 [1996]).
We have considered and rejected defendant's remaining claims. Concur—Gonzalez, P.J.,Mazzarelli, Moskowitz, Acosta and RomÁn, JJ.