| People v Ayuso |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 00389 [80 AD3d 708] |
| January 18, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v MarcusAyuso, Appellant. |
—[*1] Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, JeannetteLifschitz, and Suzanne D. O'Hare of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Blumenfeld, J.),rendered May 8, 2008, convicting him of burglary in the second degree, petit larceny, and criminalpossession of stolen property in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the defendant's requestto relieve assigned counsel and assign a new attorney. "The right of an indigent criminal defendant to theservices of a court-appointed lawyer does not encompass a right to appointment of successive lawyersat the defendant's option" (People vMcClam, 60 AD3d 968, 969 [2009]). "[B]efore substitution of counsel is granted, goodcause, such as a conflict of interest or irreconcilable differences, must be demonstrated" (People v Martin, 41 AD3d 616, 616[2007]). In determining whether good cause has been shown, relevant factors include "the timing of thedefendant's request, its effect on the progress of the case and whether present counsel will likelyprovide the defendant with meaningful assistance" (People v Linares, 2 NY3d 507, 510 [2004]; see People vMedina, 44 NY2d 199, 208 [1978]; People v Stevenson, 36 AD3d 634 [2007]).
Here, the Supreme Court conducted a sufficient inquiry regarding the basis of the defendant'srequest, and no further inquiry was required, as the defendant's assertions did not suggest the seriouspossibility of a genuine conflict of interest or other impediment to the defendant's representation byassigned counsel. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant'srequest for reassignment of counsel (see People v Linares, 2 NY3d at 511-512; People v Lopez, 49 AD3d 899 [2008];People v Stevenson, 36 AD3d at 634-635; People v Robinson, 285 AD2d 478[2001]).
The defendant contends, in his supplemental brief, that the persistent violent felony offendersentencing scheme set forth in Penal Law § 70.08 violates the Sixth Amendment to the UnitedStates Constitution, based on the principles enunciated in Apprendi v New Jersey (530 US466 [2000]). That contention is without merit (see People v Bell, 15 NY3d 935 [2010]; People v Leon, 10 NY3d 122, 126[2008], cert denied 554 US 926 [2008]; People v Alvarez, 76 AD3d 1098 [2010]; People v Caldwell, 74 AD3d 676[2010]; People v Thomas, 47 AD3d850, 851 [2008]; People v David B., 14 AD3d [*2]617,618-619 [2005]; see also People vQuinones, 12 NY3d 116, 125-128 [2009], cert denied 558 US —, 130 S Ct104 [2009]; People v Rivera, 5 NY3d61, 67-68 [2005], cert denied 546 US 984 [2005]; Portalatin v Graham, 624F3d 69 [2d Cir 2010]). Skelos, J.P., Covello, Hall and Sgroi, JJ., concur.