Matter of Dominique P.
2011 NY Slip Op 01703 [82 AD3d 478]
March 8, 2011
Appellate Division, First Department
As corrected through Wednesday, May 11, 2011


In the Matter of Dominique P., a Person Alleged to be a JuvenileDelinquent, Appellant.

[*1]Tamara A. Steckler, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Marcia Egger of counsel), forappellant.

Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York (Pamela Seider Dolgow of counsel),for presentment agency.

Orders of disposition, Family Court, New York County (Susan R. Larabee, J.), entered on orabout July 29, 2010, which adjudicated appellant a juvenile delinquent upon his admissions thathe committed acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crimes of burglary in thesecond degree (three counts) and attempted grand larceny in the fourth degree (three counts), andplaced him with the Office of Children and Family Services for an aggregate period of 18months, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The court properly denied appellant's suppression motion. After being lawfully arrested,appellant voluntarily confessed that he took part in numerous residential burglaries.

There was probable cause for appellant's arrest (see People v Bigelow, 66 NY2d 417,423 [1985]; Spinelli v United States, 393 US 410 [1969]; Aguilar v Texas, 378US 108 [1964]). Three identified citizen informants provided the police with detailed andspecific information concerning appellant's involvement in a series of burglaries. While none ofthese informants initiated contact with the police, there is no evidence that any of them sought orobtained any benefits in return for their information. Their status as identified citizens satisfiedthe reliability prong of the Aguilar/Spinelli test (see People v Hetrick, 80NY2d 344, 348 [1992]; People v Hicks, 38 NY2d 90 [1975]). The basis-of-knowledgeprong was clearly satisfied as to two of the informants, since they both heard appellant admit hisown involvement in the burglaries.

The totality of the circumstances establishes the voluntariness of appellant's confession(see Fare v Michael C., 442 US 707, 725-728 [1979]; People v Anderson, 42NY2d 35, 38-39 [1977]). The circumstances were not coercive, and the police complied withevery requirement of Family Court Act § 305.2. Given the seriousness and complexity ofthe charges, it was clearly necessary to take appellant to a designated facility for questioning(see Family Ct Act § 305.2 [4] [b]). Two representatives of Children's Village, theentity that was "legally responsible for the child's care" (Family Ct Act § 305.2 [3]), werepresent, and appellant's challenges to the suitability of these persons are without merit (see Matter of Richard UU., 56 AD3d973, 975 [2008]). The delay in commencing the questioning was reasonable in light of thetime consumed in obtaining the presence of the [*2]Children'sVillage employees. The length of the interrogation was reasonable in light of the large number ofburglaries and the need to conduct a canvass in which appellant identified the locations heburglarized. We have considered and rejected appellant's remaining challenges to his confession.Concur—Tom, J.P., Sweeny, Renwick, Freedman and Manzanet-Daniels, JJ.


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