| Walker v City of New York |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 01999 [82 AD3d 966] |
| March 15, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Janice Walker, Individually and as Mother and Natural Guardian ofJennifer Brown, an Infant, Appellant, v City of New York et al.,Respondents. |
—[*1] Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Kristin M. Helmers, JulieRubenstein, and Deborah A. Brenner of counsel), for respondents.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiff appeals from an orderof the Supreme Court, Kings County (Miller, J.), dated January 21, 2010, which granted thedefendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
Jennifer Brown allegedly sustained injuries when she slipped or tripped on an allegedlydefective condition on a concrete playground while playing "tag" during school recess. Brown,by her mother and natural guardian, Janice Walker, and Janice Walker, individually, commencedthis action against the defendants, City of New York and the Department of Education of the Cityof New York (hereinafter together the defendants), to recover damages for personal injuriesarising from negligent supervision and negligent maintenance. The defendants moved forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that they did not have actual orconstructive notice of the condition or, alternatively, that Brown assumed the risk of injury, and,in any event, that their supervision of Brown was reasonable as a matter of law. The SupremeCourt granted the motion.
Contrary to the defendants' contention and the conclusion of the Supreme Court, the doctrineof primary assumption of risk is not applicable to the facts herein (see Trupia v Lake George Cent. SchoolDist., 14 NY3d 392, 396 [2010]; Sarnes v City of New York, 73 AD3d 1154 [2010]). Nevertheless,the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissingthe complaint on the grounds that they lacked actual or constructive notice of the allegedlydangerous condition and that their supervision of Brown was reasonable as a matter of law.
Schools have a duty to adequately supervise children in its charge, and "will be held liablefor foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision" (Mirand vCity of New York, 84 NY2d 44, 49 [1994]; Paca v City of New York, 51 AD3d 991, 992 [2008]). However,schools "are not insurers of [the] safety" of their students, "for they cannot reasonably beexpected to continuously supervise and control all movements and activities of students"(Mirand v City of [*2]New York, 84 NY2d at 49). Here,the defendants established, prima facie, that they did not negligently supervise Brown withevidence demonstrating sufficient supervision by teachers and that Brown was engaged in normalplay at the time of the occurrence. In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact(see Calcagno v John F. KennedyIntermediate School, 61 AD3d 911, 912 [2009]; Lemos v City of PoughkeepsieSchool Dist., 299 AD2d 327 [2002]; Berdecia v City of New York, 289 AD2d 354,354-355 [2001]).
The defendants also established, prima facie, that they did not have actual or constructivenotice of the condition, i.e., the presence of a tar-like substance, that allegedly caused Brown'saccident with evidence showing that they had recently inspected the playground before Brown'saccident and the inspection did not reveal the allegedly hazardous condition over which shealleges she slipped or tripped (seeGiulini v Union Free School Dist. #1, 70 AD3d 632, 632-633 [2010]; Gennaro v Cord Meyer Dev. Co. &LLC, 57 AD3d 725 [2008]; DeFalco v BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., 38 AD3d 824 [2007];Jansen v Roosevelt Union Free School Dist., 302 AD2d 495 [2003]; Labella v WillisSeafood, 296 AD2d 382 [2002]; Goldman v Waldbaum, Inc., 248 AD2d 436, 437[1998]). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Zuckerman v Cityof New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants' motion for summaryjudgment dismissing the complaint. Angiolillo, J.P., Florio, Belen and Austin, JJ., concur.