| Alexander v City of New York |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 02337 [82 AD3d 1022] |
| March 22, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Anderson Alexander, Respondent, v City of New York,Appellant. |
—[*1] Queller, Fisher, Washor, Fuchs & Kool, LLP (Mauro Lilling Naparty LLP, Great Neck, N.Y.[Barbara D. Goldberg and Matthew W. Naparty], of counsel), for respondent.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries pursuant to GeneralMunicipal Law § 205-e, the defendant appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court,Kings County (Schack, J.), entered January 15, 2010, which, upon the denial of its motionpursuant to CPLR 4401 for judgment as a matter of law made at the close of the plaintiff's case,upon a jury verdict, and upon an order of the same court dated February 27, 2009, which deniedits motion pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) to set aside the jury verdict and for judgment as a matter oflaw, or to set aside the jury verdict as contrary to the weight of the evidence and for a new trial, isin favor of the plaintiff and against it in the principal sum of $5,043,893.88.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, that branch of the defendant'smotion pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) which was to set aside the jury verdict and for judgment as amatter of law is granted, the complaint is dismissed, and the order dated February 27, 2009, ismodified accordingly.
The plaintiff, a former New York City Police Department (hereinafter NYPD) detective,accidentally shot himself in the knee in a precinct station house office. The plaintiff commencedthis action seeking, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries pursuant to GeneralMunicipal Law § 205-e, based on a claimed violation of Labor Law § 27-a, whichrequires, among other things, that public employers furnish their employees with a place ofemployment free from hazards that are likely to cause death or serious physical harm.Specifically, the plaintiff asserted that this incident occurred when he leaned back in a swivelchair at an NYPD station house, in order to place a fellow officer's gun in his waistband. At trial,the plaintiff testified that, when he leaned back in the chair, he began to "fall back" and the chair"collapse[d]" or "did not hold [his] weight." While the plaintiff was falling, he accidentallypulled the trigger on the gun, causing it to fire. The plaintiff did not testify that the chair or partof the chair broke off or broke apart during this incident, and he testified that the back of thechair returned to its original position after the accident. He further testified that, prior to theaccident, he had not observed any defective condition of this chair. At trial, although evidencewas presented that another police detective had fallen out of a chair at the same station houseapproximately one or two years prior to the plaintiff's accident, no [*2]evidence was presented to show that the chair involved in theplaintiff's accident was the same type of chair as the one involved in the prior accident or that,prior to the plaintiff's accident, any employees of the NYPD had complained to supervisors aboutthe plaintiff's chair. Moreover, the detective involved in the prior accident testified that he hadnot reported his accident, but simply replaced his chair with another. The jury returned a verdictin favor of the plaintiff.
In an action pursuant to General Municipal Law §§ 205-a or 205-e, a firefighteror police officer must establish that he or she was injured "as a result of any neglect, omission,willful or culpable negligence" of the defendant "in failing to comply with the requirements ofany of the statutes, ordinances, rules, orders and requirements of the federal, state, county,village, town or city governments" (General Municipal Law § 205-a [1]; § 205-e[1]). In such an action, however, "it is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove such notice aswould be required under a common-law theory of negligence." (Lustenring v 98-100 Realty, 1 AD3d574, 578 [2003].) Rather, the plaintiff must only establish that "the circumstancessurrounding the violation indicate that it was a result of neglect, omission, willful or culpablenegligence on the defendant's part" (id. [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Terranova v New York City Tr.Auth., 49 AD3d 10, 17-18 [2007]; Anthony v New York City Tr. Auth., 38 AD3d 484, 486 [2007];McCullagh v McJunkin, 240 AD2d 713 [1997]; Lusenskas v Axelrod, 183 AD2d244, 248-249 [1992]). Here, the Supreme Court properly charged the jury in accordance withthese principles.
Further, the Supreme Court did not err in charging the jury that the principles of comparativenegligence are inapplicable to actions commenced pursuant to General Municipal Law §205-e (see Giuffrida v Citibank Corp., 100 NY2d 72, 83 [2003]; Mullen v Zoebe,Inc., 86 NY2d 135, 142 [1995]; O'Connor v City of New York, 280 AD2d 309[2001]; Warner v Adelphi Univ., 240 AD2d 730, 731-732 [1997]).
However, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the defendant's motionwhich was pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) to set aside the jury verdict and for judgment as a matterof law. In evaluating the legal sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court must determinewhether there is any "valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possiblylead [a] rational [person] to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidencepresented at trial" (Cohen v Hallmark Cards, 45 NY2d 493, 499 [1978]). Here, there wasno valid line of reasoning which could have led to the conclusion that the claimed violation ofLabor Law § 27-a resulted from the defendant's "neglect, omission, willful or culpablenegligence" (General Municipal Law § 205-e [1]). Specifically, while a defendant's generalknowledge of a recurring or similar condition may, under some circumstances, establish that therequisite notice of that condition existed for purposes of liability under General Municipal Law§ 205-e (see Terranova v New York City Tr. Auth., 49 AD3d at 17-18;O'Grady v New York City Hous. Auth., 259 AD2d 442 [1999]; Lusenskas vAxelrod, 183 AD2d at 249), here, there was no evidence showing that, prior to theoccurrence that underlies the plaintiff's action, the defendant had knowledge of any defects in thechair involved in the accident. Thus, for purposes of liability pursuant to General Municipal Law§ 205-e, the evidence was legally insufficient to establish the defendant's culpability for thealleged violation of Labor Law § 27-a (see McCullagh v McJunkin, 240 AD2d at713-714; Infante v State of New York, 266 AD2d 130 [1999]).
In light of our determination, we need not reach the defendant's remaining contentions.Covello, J.P., Belen, Hall and Cohen, JJ., concur.