| Dimery v Ulster Sav. Bank |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 02345 [82 AD3d 1034] |
| March 22, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Alice Laraine Dimery, Appellant, v Ulster Savings Bank,Respondent. |
—[*1] Alston & Bird LLP, New York, N.Y. (John P. Doherty of counsel), for respondent.
In an action, inter alia, for an accounting, which was consolidated with a summary holdoverproceeding to recover possession of and to evict the plaintiff from certain real property, theplaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Putnam County (O'Rourke, J.), datedFebruary 18, 2009, which (a) denied her motion pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (3), (4) and (5) tovacate a judgment of the same court (Hickman, J.), entered October 26, 2000, providing, amongother things, for her eviction from her home on the subject real property, and (b) enjoined herfrom bringing any further motions regarding the subject matter of the action without thepermission of the Supreme Court.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was pursuantto CPLR 5015 (a) (3) to vacate a judgment entered October 26, 2000. A party seeking relief froma judgment pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (3) must make the motion within a reasonable time (see Bank of N.Y. v Stradford, 55 AD3d765 [2008]; Rizzo v St. LawrenceUniv., 24 AD3d 983, 984 [2005]; Aames Capital Corp. v Davidsohn, 24 AD3d 474 [2005]). Here, theplaintiff's delay of more than eight years after the entry of the subject judgment was unreasonable(Sieger v Sieger, 51 AD3d1004, 1006 [2008]; Aames Capital Corp. v Davidsohn, 24 AD3d at 475).
The Supreme Court also properly denied those branches of the plaintiff's motion which werepursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (4) and (5) to vacate the subject judgment. With the exception of theplaintiff's contentions regarding the removal and subsequent disposition of her personal propertyduring the defendant's June 13, 2001 eviction of the plaintiff from her home on the subjectpremises, the plaintiff's contentions could have been raised on her prior appeal from thejudgment (see Dimery v Ulster Sav.Bank, 13 AD3d 574 [2004], cert denied 547 US 1097 [2006]). Accordingly, theplaintiff waived appellate review of those issues (see New York Tel. Co. v Supervisor of Town of Oyster Bay, 35 AD3d417 [2006]; Young v Tseng, 23AD3d 552 [2005]).
The plaintiff's remaining contentions, based on the removal and subsequent disposition of herpersonal property during the June 13, 2001, eviction, are time-barred (see CPLR 213 [1],[2]; 214 [3], [4]).[*2]
Public policy generally mandates free access to the courts(see Matter of Leopold, 287 AD2d 718 [2001]; Sassower v Signorelli, 99 AD2d358, 359 [1984]). Here, however, the record reflects that the plaintiff forfeited that right byabusing the judicial process through vexatious litigation. Accordingly, it was not improper for theSupreme Court to enjoin the plaintiff from bringing any further motions regarding the subjectmatter of the instant action without its permission (see Matter of Ram v Hershowitz, 76 AD3d 1022, 1023 [2010]; Vogelgesang v Vogelgesang, 71 AD3d1132, 1134 [2010]; Matter of Manwani v Manwani, 286 AD2d 767, 768-769 [2001];cf. Deshpande v Medisys HealthNetwork, Inc., 70 AD3d 760, 763 [2010]). Prudenti, P.J., Eng, Belen and Sgroi, JJ.,concur.