People v Taylor
2011 NY Slip Op 02429 [82 AD3d 1133]
March 22, 2011
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, May 11, 2011


The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Darrell Taylor, Appellant.

[*1]Joseph R. Faraguna, Sag Harbor, N.Y., for appellant.

Thomas J. Spota, District Attorney, Riverhead, N.Y. (Michael Blakey of counsel; GregoryZak on the brief), for respondent.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (R. Doyle,J.), rendered February 4, 2008, convicting him of gang assault in the first degree and assault inthe first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review thedenial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppressstatements he made to law enforcement officials.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion whichwas to suppress statements he made to law enforcement officials. The Supreme Court properlyfound that the defendant's initial statements to police officers when they first encountered him,and after he and his brother followed the officers back to their car, were admissible since thedefendant was not then in custody. The record reveals that the defendant would reasonably havebelieved that he was free to leave the presence of the police at those times (see People vBrown, 295 AD2d 442, 443 [2002]). The defendant's subsequent statements to a policesergeant, made as he sat handcuffed in a police car, were also admissible since the recorddemonstrates that those statements were spontaneous and not the product of police interrogationor its functional equivalent (see People v Fernandes, 62 AD3d 721, 721 [2009];People v Patterson, 48 AD3d 487, 488 [2008]; see also People v Lynes, 49 NY2d286, 294-295 [1980]). Furthermore, the defendant's oral and written statements to a detective atthe police precinct were admissible since they were made after he knowingly and intelligentlywaived his Miranda rights (see People v Latimer, 75 AD3d 562, 563 [2010];see also Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]).

The defendant's challenge to the racial composition of the jury panel was waived by hisfailure to make that challenge in writing prior to the selection of the jury (see CPL 270.10[2]; People v Messiah, 247 AD2d 490, 491 [1998]; People v Branch, 244 AD2d562, 562 [1997]; People v Battle, 221 AD2d 648, 648 [1995]).

The defendant's contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to support hisconvictions of gang assault in the first degree and assault in the first degree is unpreserved forappellate review (see People v LaGuerre, 29 AD3d 820, 821 [2006]). In any event,viewing the evidence [*2]in the light most favorable to theprosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legallysufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of those crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. Upon ourindependent review pursuant to CPL 470.15 (5), we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was notagainst the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).

The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80, 83-85[1982]).

The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit. Dillon, J.P., Leventhal, Chambersand Austin, JJ., concur.


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