| Midwood Chayim Aruchim Dialysis Assoc., Inc. v Brooklyn Dialysis,LLC |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 02639 [82 AD3d 1177] |
| March 29, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Midwood Chayim Aruchim Dialysis Associates, Inc.,Appellant, v Brooklyn Dialysis, LLC, Respondent. |
—[*1] Law Offices of K.C. Okoli, P.C., New York, N.Y., for respondent.
In an action, inter alia, for an accounting and to recover damages for breach of contract andunjust enrichment, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of theSupreme Court, Kings County (Ambrosio, J.), dated October 2, 2009, as denied that branch of itsmotion which was to disqualify K.C. Okoli and the Law Offices of K.C. Okoli, P.C., from thecontinued representation of the defendant.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
"The basis of a disqualification motion is an allegation of a breach of a fiduciary duty owedby an attorney to a current or former client" (Rowley v Waterfront Airways, 113 AD2d926, 927 [1985]; see Matter of Kelly, 23 NY2d 368, 375-376 [1968]; Ogilvie vMcDonald's Corp., 294 AD2d 550, 552 [2002]). However, "[d]isqualification denies aparty's right to representation by the attorney of its choice" (S & S Hotel Ventures Ltd.Partnership v 777 S. H. Corp., 69 NY2d 437, 443 [1987]; see Tekni-Plex, Inc. v Meyner& Landis, 89 NY2d 123, 131 [1996]), and may create "significant hardships" for that party(Solow v Grace & Co., 83 NY2d 303, 310 [1994]; see Tekni-Plex, Inc. v Meyner &Landis, 89 NY2d at 131; S & S Hotel Ventures Ltd. Partnership v 777 S. H. Corp.,69 NY2d at 443).
Accordingly, where the Rules of Professional Conduct (22 NYCRR 1200.0) are invoked inlitigation, courts "are not constrained to read the rules literally or effectuate the intent of thedrafters, but look to the rules as guidelines to be applied with due regard for the broad range ofinterests at stake" (Niesig v Team I, 76 NY2d 363, 369-370 [1990]; see S & S HotelVentures Ltd. Partnership v 777 S. H. Corp., 69 NY2d at 443). It is the Supreme Court'sresponsibility to balance the competing interests, and "[t]he disqualification of an attorney is amatter that rests within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court" (Falk v Gallo, 73AD3d 685, 685 [2010]; see Cardinale v Golinello, 43 NY2d 288, 292 [1977]; Matterof Erlanger [Erlanger], 20 NY2d 778, 779 [1967]; Nationscredit Fin. Servs. Corp. vTurcios, 41 AD3d 802 [2007]; Flores v Willard J. Price Assoc., LLC, 20 AD3d 343,344 [2005]; Schmidt v Magnetic Head Corp., 101 AD2d 268, 277 [1984]). Under thecircumstances present here, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretionwhen it denied the plaintiff's motion to disqualify the defendant's attorney (see Campbell vMcKeon, 75 AD3d 479, 480 [2010]; Kushner v Herman, 215 AD2d 633, 633 [1995];Matter of Fleet v Pulsar Constr. Corp., 143 AD2d 187, 189 [1988]; Lopez v PrecisionPapers, 99 AD2d 507, 508 [1984]; cf. Morris v Morris, 306 AD2d 449, 452 [2003]).Covello, J.P., Belen, Hall and Cohen, JJ., concur.