| Matter of State of New York v Anonymous |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 02686 [82 AD3d 1250] |
| March 29, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of State of New York,Respondent, v Anonymous et al., Appellant. |
—[*1] Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York, N.Y. (Benjamin N. Gutman andRichard O. Jackson of counsel), for respondent.
In a proceeding pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law article 10 for the civil management ofAnonymous, an alleged sex offender allegedly suffering from a mental abnormality and requiringcivil management, Anonymous appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County(Pitts, J.), dated October 15, 2009, which, upon a jury verdict finding that he suffers from amental abnormality as defined in Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03 (i), and a determinationmade after a dispositional hearing that he currently is a dangerous sex offender requiring civilconfinement, granted the petition and directed that he be committed to a secure treatment facilityfor care and treatment.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The State of New York commenced this proceeding pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law article10, also known as the Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act (hereinafter SOMTA), forthe civil management of Anonymous (hereinafter the appellant), an alleged sex offenderallegedly suffering from a mental abnormality and requiring civil management. After certainother procedural steps, not at issue on this appeal, the Supreme Court conducted a jury trial, anda unanimous jury found that the appellant suffers from a "mental abnormality," as that phrase isdefined in SOMTA (see Mental Hygiene Law § 10.07 [c], [d]; see alsoMental Hygiene Law § 10.03 [g], [i]).
Thereafter, the Supreme Court conducted a dispositional hearing, after which it found thatthe mental abnormality from which the appellant suffers involves such a strong predisposition tocommit sex offenses, and such an inability to control behavior, that he is likely to be a danger toothers and to commit sex offenses if he is not confined to a secure treatment facility (seeMental Hygiene Law § 10.07 [f]). Based on that finding, the Supreme Court made themandatory dispositional determination that the appellant is a dangerous sex offender requiringconfinement, granted the petition, and directed that he be committed to a secure treatment facilityfor care and treatment (see Mental Hygiene Law § 10.07 [f]).
Contrary to the appellant's contention, the Supreme Court did not err in denying hischallenge, for cause, to a prospective juror (see CPL 270.20 [1] [b]; Mental Hygiene Law§ 10.07 [b]; [*2]People v Harris, 247 AD2d 630,631-632 [1998]; People v Davis, 221 AD2d 653 [1995]; cf. People v Rose, 73AD3d 1091, 1092 [2010]; People v Light, 260 AD2d 404, 405-406 [1999]; People vGrant, 297 AD2d 687, 688 [2002]).
To the extent that any of an Assistant Attorney General's remarks during opening statementsand summation were improper, they were not so egregious as to permeate the trial and create aclimate of hostility that effectively deprived the appellant of a fair trial (see Bianco v FlushingHosp. Med. Ctr., 79 AD3d 777 [2010]; Matter of State of New York v Andrew O.,68 AD3d 1161, 1166 [2009], lv granted 14 NY3d 706 [2010]; Alston v SunharborManor, LLC, 48 AD3d 600, 602 [2008]; Roseingrave v Massapequa Gen. Hosp., 298AD2d 377 [2002]).
The Supreme Court did not err in allowing two of the psychiatric experts who examined theappellant to testify to details of the appellant's sex offense history, since the purpose of thetestimony was to explain the basis for the experts' opinions (see Mental Hygiene Law§ 10.08 [b]; Matter of State of New York v Wilkes, 77 AD3d 1451, 1451-1453[2010]; Matter of State of New York v Andrew O., 68 AD3d at 1167; People vWlasiuk, 32 AD3d 674, 680 [2006]; People v Campbell, 197 AD2d 930, 932[1993]). Moreover, much of the information upon which the challenged experts based theirtestimony was deduced from business records (see State of New York v Dove, 18 Misc3d 254 [2007]; Mental Hygiene Law § 10.08 [b]), the appellant pleaded guilty to the sexoffenses, and the appellant relayed the details of the sex offenses to those experts when theyexamined him, thereby establishing the reliability of the information (see Matter of State ofNew York v Wilkes, 77 AD3d at 1453; Matter of State of New York v Andrew O.,68 AD3d at 1167).
The evidence upon which the jury made its determination was legally sufficient to supportthe verdict since there was a valid line of reasoning by which the jury could conclude that theappellant suffered from a mental abnormality based on the evidence presented at trial (seeMatter of State of New York v Derrick B., 68 AD3d 1124, 1126 [2009]). Moreover, thejury's verdict that the appellant suffered from a mental abnormality was supported by a fairinterpretation of the evidence and, thus, was not contrary to the weight of the evidence (seeMental Hygiene Law § 10.03 [i]; § 10.07 [a]; Matter of State of New York vDerrick B., 68 AD3d at 1126).
The admission of testimony of two of the appellant's victims during the dispositional hearingwas not prejudicial since there is a presumption that a court, as factfinder, will consider onlycompetent evidence and is uniquely capable of distinguishing those issues properly before it fromthose which are not (see People v Weinberg, 75 AD3d 612 [2010]; People vKozlow, 46 AD3d 913, 915-916 [2007]). The Supreme Court specifically stated in itsmemorandum decision that it "discounted" the victims' testimony since it was irrelevant to theissues to be determined at the dispositional hearing.
Contrary to the appellant's further contention, clear and convincing evidence supports theSupreme Court's finding that the State established that the mental abnormality from whichappellant suffers involves such a strong predisposition to commit sex offenses and such aninability to control behavior that he is likely to be a danger to others and to commit sex offensesif he is not confined to a secure treatment facility, and its concomitant determination that theappellant is a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement (see Mental Hygiene Law§ 10.07 [f]; Matter of State of New York v Steven L., 66 AD3d 788, 789-790[2009]; see generally Matter of Stavisky v Koo, 54 AD3d 432, 433-434 [2008]). Covello,J.P., Hall, Lott and Cohen, JJ., concur.