| Hatem v Hatem |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 02846 [83 AD3d 663] |
| April 5, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Sandra Elena Hatem, Respondent, v Albert AnthonyHatem, Appellant. |
—[*1] Melvin H. Bernheimer, P.C., Hicksville, N.Y. (Denise Luparello of counsel), forrespondent.
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the defendant appeals from so much of an orderof the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Lubell, J.), entered October 21, 2009, as, upongranting that branch of his motion which was for an award of child support, directed that theplaintiff's obligation to pay child support would be effective as of August 1, 2009, rather than asof April 6, 2009, the date the defendant filed his motion, and, upon granting the cross motion ofthe Attorney for the Child for an award of fees, in effect, directed that payment of the fees bemade from escrow funds consisting of proceeds from the sale of the marital residence.
Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof directing thatthe plaintiff's obligation to pay child support would be effective as of August 1, 2009, andsubstituting therefor a provision directing that the plaintiff's obligation to pay child support beeffective as of April 6, 2009; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from,without costs or disbursements.
As an initial matter, "CPLR 5515 (1) requires that a notice of appeal designate the judgmentor order, or specific part of the judgment or order, from which the appeal is taken. Thisrequirement is jurisdictional. By taking an appeal from only a part of a judgment or order, a partywaives its right to appeal from the remainder thereof" (City of Mount Vernon v MountVernon Hous. Auth., 235 AD2d 516, 516-517 [1997] [citations omitted]). Given the limitedscope of the defendant's notice of appeal, his contentions concerning the Supreme Court's denialof his cross motion for a money judgment against the plaintiff are not properly before this Court(see Paterno v Carroll, 75 AD3d625, 629 [2010]; Huger v Cushman& Wakefield, Inc., 58 AD3d 682, 683 [2009]; City of Mount Vernon v MountVernon Hous. Auth., 235 AD2d at 516-517).
The defendant is correct that the Supreme Court erred in failing to make the child supportaward retroactive to the date that he filed his motion (see Domestic Relations Law§ 236 [B] [7] [a]; Ross v Ross, 157 AD2d 652, 653 [1990]; Nappi v Nappi,234 AD2d 276, 278 [1996]; Banks v Banks, 148 AD2d 407, 408 [1989]; Bernstein vBernstein, 143 AD2d 168, 170 [1988]). There is no basis in the record for [*2]the Supreme Court to have diverged from the statutory mandate.Accordingly, we modify the order appealed from by directing that the plaintiff's child supportobligation be effective as of April 6, 2009, the date that the defendant filed his motion (seeDomestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [7] [a]).
Contrary to the defendant's contention, under the circumstances of this case, the SupremeCourt did not err in directing that the payment of fees to the Attorney for the Child be made fromescrow funds consisting of proceeds from the sale of the marital residence. Covello, J.P., Eng,Hall and Lott, JJ., concur.