| People v Perez |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 02907 [83 AD3d 738] |
| April 5, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Reinaldo Perez, Appellant. |
—[*1]
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County(Wetzel, J.), rendered April 30, 2010, convicting him of burglary in the second degree, upon hisplea of guilty, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying, without ahearing, the defendant's pro se application to withdraw his plea of guilty. A motion to withdraw aplea of guilty is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, whose determination generallywill not be disturbed absent an improvident exercise of discretion (see People v Harris, 74 AD3d 838,839 [2010]; People v Wiedmer, 71AD3d 1067 [2010]; People vGedin, 46 AD3d 701 [2007]). Only rarely is a defendant entitled to a full evidentiaryhearing on a motion to withdraw the plea (see People v Tinsley, 35 NY2d 926, 927[1974]; People v Griffith, 78 AD3d1194, 1195 [2010]). "Instead, it is sufficient if the court affords the defendant an opportunityto present his [or her] arguments with respect to withdrawal" (People v Griffith, 78 AD3dat 1195; see People v Fiumefreddo, 82 NY2d 536, 543-544 [1993]; People vTinsley, 35 NY2d at 927). Here, the record supports the Supreme Court's determination thatthe defendant's plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently (see People vFiumefreddo, 82 NY2d at 543; People v Harris, 74 AD3d at 839). The defendant'sunsubstantiated and conclusory assertions of innocence, coercion, and ineffective assistance ofcounsel were contradicted by the record and, therefore, were insufficient to warrant withdrawalor a hearing (see People v Griffith, 78 AD3d at 1195; People v Wiedmer, 71AD3d at 1067; People v Potter, 294 AD2d 603, 604 [2002]; People v D'Orio, 210AD2d 424, 425 [1994]; People v Grady, 110 AD2d 780, 780-781 [1985]).
"[T]he defendant's waiver of his right to appeal precludes review of his contention that hewas denied the effective assistance of counsel, except to the extent that the alleged ineffectiveassistance affected the voluntariness of his plea" (People v Gedin, 46 AD3d at 701; see People v Aguayo, 73 AD3d938, 939 [2010]; People vTaubenkraut, 48 AD3d 598 [2008]). To the extent the defendant contends that hiscounsel was ineffective such that the voluntariness of his plea was affected, the record revealsthat the defendant received an advantageous plea, and nothing in the record casts doubt on theeffectiveness of counsel (see People v Ford, 86 NY2d 397, 404 [1995]; People vAguayo, 73 AD3d [*2]at 939; People v Mercer, 69 AD3d 960[2010]; People v Gallo, 54 AD3d964, 965 [2008]). Covello, J.P., Angiolillo, Dickerson and Roman, JJ., concur.