| Mimran v Mimran |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 03175 [83 AD3d 550] |
| April 21, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| Lucy Mimran, Respondent, v David Mimran,Appellant. |
—[*1] William S. Beslow, New York, for respondent.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Saralee Evans, J.), entered February 4, 2009,which, insofar as appealed from, directed defendant to pay plaintiff $200,000 as interim counselfees, and, as part of defendant's temporary child support obligation, $10,000 per month forhousekeeping staff and $10,000 per month for vacations and other recreational expenses,unanimously modified, on the law and the facts, to the extent of vacating the award to plaintiff of$200,000 in interim counsel fees without prejudice to a renewal of the application, and otherwiseaffirmed.
Based on this record, we cannot conclude that the pendente lite awards for housekeepingstaff, vacations and other recreational expenses for the children are disguised temporarymaintenance awards in excess of the maintenance provided for in the parties' prenuptialagreement. To be sure, the motion court stated that the award for vacations and recreationalexpenses was "for plaintiff and the children" (emphasis added). However, the childrenreside with plaintiff, so we construe the italicized phrase to permit portions of the award to bespent on plaintiff to the extent reasonably necessary in connection with vacations andrecreational expenses for the children. Moreover, under all the circumstances and, in particular,the extraordinarily high standard of living to which the children are accustomed (see Baker vBaker, 120 AD2d 374, 375 [1986]), we cannot find that the award was inappropriate.
Regardless of whether plaintiff otherwise made a sufficient showing to support an award ofinterim counsel fees (see CharpiÉ v CharpiÉ, 271 AD2d 169, 173 [2000]),defendant is correct that neither plaintiff nor her counsel provided adequate documentation of theamount of fees already paid, the amount required for experts, the dates and nature of the servicespreviously rendered, or the number of hours of work to be performed (Wolf v Wolf, 146AD2d 527 [1989]; Covington v Covington, 249 AD2d 735, 735 [1998]; Hughes vHughes, 208 AD2d 502 [1994]; 22 NYCRR 202.16 [k] [3]). Thus, there is insufficientevidence to support an award for [*2]outstanding fees alreadyincurred and no basis upon which an appropriate prospective fee award can be determined.
We have considered defendant's other arguments and find them unavailing.Concur—Friedman, J.P., Catterson, McGuire, Acosta and Renwick, JJ.