| Bermudez v New York City Bd. of Educ. |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 03196 [83 AD3d 878] |
| April 19, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Jonathan Bermudez, Respondent, v New York City Boardof Education, Appellant. |
—[*1] Frederick A. Nicholson (Pollack, Pollack, Isaac & DeCicco, New York, N.Y. [Brian J. Isaacand Michael H. Zhu], of counsel), for respondent.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from a judgmentof the Supreme Court, Kings County (Starkey, J.), dated October 14, 2009, which, upon a juryverdict on the issue of damages finding that the plaintiff sustained damages in the principal sumsof $190,000 for past pain and suffering, $840,000 for future pain and suffering, and $96,000 forfuture medical expenses, and upon the denial of its motion pursuant to CPLR 4404 to set asidethe verdict, inter alia, on the issue of liability and for judgment as a matter of law or, in thealternative, as contrary to the weight of the evidence and for a new trial or, in the alternative, toset aside the damages award for future pain and suffering as excessive, is in favor of the plaintiffand against it.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
For a reviewing court to determine that a jury's verdict is not supported by legally sufficientevidence, it must conclude that there is "simply no valid line of reasoning and permissibleinferences" by which the jury could have rationally reached its verdict on the basis of theevidence presented at trial (Cohen v Hallmark Cards, 45 NY2d 493, 499 [1978]; seeSzczerbiak v Pilat, 90 NY2d 553, 556 [1997]). In addition, a jury verdict should not be setaside as contrary to the weight of the evidence unless the jury could not have reached the verdictby any fair interpretation of the evidence (see Lolik v Big V Supermarkets, 86 NY2d 744,746 [1995]; Piazza v Corporate Bldrs.Group, Inc., 73 AD3d 1006, 1006-1007 [2010]). Whether a jury verdict should be setaside as contrary to the weight of the evidence does not involve a question of law, but ratherrequires a discretionary balancing of many factors (see Cohen v Hallmark Cards, 45NY2d at 499; Nicastro v Park, 113 AD2d 129, 133 [1985]). "It is for the jury to makedeterminations as to the credibility of the witnesses, and great deference in this regard isaccorded to the jury, which had the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses" (Exarhouleas v Green 317 Madison,LLC, 46 AD3d 854, 855 [2007]; see Salony v Mastellone, 72 AD3d 1060, 1061 [2010]).
Applying these principles here, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant's motion.There was a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences by which the jury could haverationally reached its verdict on the basis of the evidence presented at trial, and a fairinterpretation of the evidence supported the jury's determination that the defendant's failure toadequately supervise [*2]the plaintiff was the proximate cause ofthe plaintiff's accident and resulting injuries.
The award for future pain and suffering did not deviate materially from what would bereasonable compensation (see CPLR 5501 [c]).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit. Skelos, J.P., Belen, Lott andCohen, JJ., concur.