Kranis v Biederbeck
2011 NY Slip Op 03214 [83 AD3d 903]
April 19, 2011
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, June 8, 2011


Michael D. Kranis, Appellant,
v
Dolores Biederbeck,Respondent.

[*1]Basso & Associates, P.C., LaGrangeville, N.Y. (Bryan G. Schneider of counsel), forappellant.

Kornfeld, Rew, Newman & Simeone, Suffern, N.Y. (Maurice J. Recchia of counsel), forrespondent.

In an action to recover damages for negligence, the plaintiff appeals from an order of theSupreme Court, Dutchess County (Sproat, J.), dated March 19, 2010, which granted thedefendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that theinfant, Ryan Biederbeck, did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law§ 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

"Although 'a causally-related emotional injury, alone or in combination with a physicalinjury, can constitute a serious injury' " within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d)(Villeda v Cassas, 56 AD3d762, 762 [2008], quoting Taranto vMcCaffrey, 40 AD3d 626, 627 [2007]), such injury must be serious and verifiable, andmust also be established by objective medical evidence (see Bissonette v Compo, 307AD2d 673, 674 [2003]; see also Bovsun v Sanperi, 61 NY2d 219, 231-232 [1984]; Krivit v Pitula, 79 AD3d 1432,1432 [2010]; Chapman v Capoccia, 283 AD2d 798 [2001]).

Here, the defendant established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law bydemonstrating that the infant, Ryan Biederbeck (hereinafter the infant), did not sustain a seriousinjury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Licari v Elliott, 57NY2d 230 [1982]; Bissonette v Compo, 307 AD2d at 674; cf. Small v Zelin, 152AD2d 690, 691 [1989]). The evidence submitted by the defendant in support of her motionestablished, prima facie, that there was no objective medical evidence to support the plaintiff'sclaim that the infant suffered from severe emotional distress or post-traumatic stress disorder as aresult of the motor vehicle accident in which his father was killed. In opposition, the plaintifffailed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324[1986]). The plaintiff's experts' affidavits and evaluation report were speculative and conclusoryand did not raise a triable issue of fact as to the claim that the infant was suffering from a seriousemotional injury (see e.g. Graziano vCooling, 79 AD3d 803, 804-805 [2010]).

The plaintiff's remaining contentions are without merit.[*2]

Accordingly, the Supreme Court correctly granted thedefendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Rivera, J.P., Dickerson,Lott and Cohen, JJ., concur.


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