| Geffner v Mercy Med. Ctr. |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 03545 [83 AD3d 998] |
| April 26, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Rebecca Geffner, Appellant, v Mercy Medical Center,Respondent, et al., Defendants. |
—[*1] Mulholland, Minion & Roe, Williston Park, N.Y. (Susan B. Boland of counsel), forrespondent.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for medical malpractice and wrongful death, theplaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (O'Donoghue, J.), enteredOctober 13, 2009, which, in effect, denied her motion, among other things, to direct thedefendant Mercy Medical Center to comply with certain demands for discovery and inspection,and, inter alia, directed her to provide authorizations compliant with the Health InsurancePortability and Accountability Act of 1996 (42 USC § 1320d et seq.) to thedefendant Mercy Medical Center.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
A party is not entitled to unlimited, uncontrolled, unfettered disclosure, and the supervisionof discovery is generally left to the trial court's broad discretion (see Foster v Herbert Slepoy Corp., 74AD3d 1139 [2010]; JRP OldRiverhead Ltd. v Town of Southampton, 73 AD3d 1130 [2010]). The trial court's broadauthority to supervise discovery includes the discretion to direct the priority in which the partiesmay use disclosure devices if it finds, under the particular circumstances, that the action will beexpedited by the use of one device prior to another (see Edwards-Pitt v Doe, 294 AD2d395 [2002]; Barouh Eaton Allen Corp. v International Bus. Machs. Corp., 76 AD2d 873[1980]).
Here, the Supreme Court, in effect, denied the plaintiff's motion to compel the defendantMercy Medical Center (hereinafter the respondent) to comply with certain demands for discoveryand inspection, and directed the parties to conduct depositions. We agree with the respondent thatmany of the plaintiff's demands to which it objected were overly broad and unreasonable, andsought irrelevant material, and that therefore, under the circumstances, the Supreme Court'sexercise of discretion was provident.
The Supreme Court did not improperly direct the plaintiff to provide authorizationscompliant with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (42 USC §1320d et seq.), although neither the plaintiff nor the respondent moved for such relief. Acourt may grant relief on a motion which was not specifically requested as long as it is notdramatically unlike the relief sought, the proof supports it, and the court is satisfied that no one isprejudiced by it (see Shaw v RPA Assoc., LLC, 75 [*2]AD3d 634 [2010]; HCE Assoc. v 3000 Watermill Lane RealtyCorp., 173 AD2d 774 [1991]). This was a motion pertaining to disclosure, and the plaintiffwas not prejudiced by being required to supply the subject authorizations (see Porcelli v Northern Westchester Hosp.Ctr., 65 AD3d 176, 183 [2009]).
The plaintiff's remaining contention is without merit. Angiolillo, J.P., Florio, Leventhal andMiller, JJ., concur.