| People v Douglas |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 03629 [83 AD3d 1092] |
| April 26, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Michael Douglas, Appellant. |
—[*1] Francis D. Phillips II, District Attorney, Goshen, N.Y. (Elizabeth L. Guinup and Andrew R.Kass of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Orange County(Rosenwasser, J., at plea; Reilly J., at sentence), rendered January 9, 2006, convicting him ofcriminal possession of stolen property in the third degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposingsentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Prior to sentencing, the defendant moved to withdraw his plea of guilty, asserting that he wasinnocent, that he was coerced by his attorney into pleading guilty, and that he was deprived of theeffective assistance of counsel. The County Court denied his motion.
The decision to permit a defendant to withdraw a previously entered plea of guilty restswithin the sound discretion of the County Court and generally will not be disturbed absent animprovident exercise of discretion (see CPL 220.60 [3]; People v Seeber, 4 NY3d780 [2005]; People v Duncan, 78 AD3d 1193 [2010]; People v Haffiz, 77 AD3d767, 768 [2010]; People v Villalobos, 71 AD3d 924 [2010]). The record reflects that thedefendant's plea of guilty was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent (see People vFiumefreddo, 82 NY2d 536, 543 [1993]; People v Lopez, 71 NY2d 662, 666[1988]; People v Harris, 61 NY2d 9, 17 [1983]). The recantation evidence submitted insupport of the motion was inherently unreliable and insufficient, alone, to justify withdrawal ofthe plea (see People v Mortensen, 60 AD3d 971, 972 [2009]; People v Serrata,261 AD2d 490 [1999]; People v Baxley, 194 AD2d 681, 682 [1993]; People vLegette, 153 AD2d 760, 761 [1989]). Furthermore, the defendant's contention regarding hisinnocence is unsupported by the record and did not afford a basis for withdrawal of the plea ofguilty (see People v Alexander, 97 NY2d 482, 485 [2002]; People v Billingsley,54 NY2d 960 [1981]; People v Dixon, 29 NY2d 55, 57 [1971]; People v Duncan,78 AD3d 1193 [2010]).
The defendant's assertions that defense counsel forced him to plead guilty and that he wasdeprived of the effective assistance of counsel are belied by his statements under oath on therecord acknowledging that his plea had not been coerced and that the plea was being entered ofhis own free will (see People v Duncan, 78 AD3d 1193 [2010]; People v Turner,23 AD3d 503 503-504 [2005]; People v Sloane, 13 AD3d 400 [2004]; People vRaymond, 3 AD3d 587 [2004]). Further, "[t]he defendant expressed no dissatisfaction [*2]with his counsel at the time of the plea, after the court had fullyapprised him of the consequences of pleading guilty" (People v Hall, 195 AD2d 521, 522[1993]; see People v Raymond, 3 AD3d 587 [2004]). Moreover, the defendant's claim ofineffective assistance of counsel was largely based upon unsubstantiated conclusory allegationsand, thus, his motion pursuant to CPL 220.60 (3) was properly denied without a hearing (seeStrickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 687 [1984]; Hill v Lockhart, 474 US 52,59-60 [1985]; People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 712-713 [1998]). Rivera, J.P.,Angiolillo, Eng, Chambers and Sgroi, JJ., concur.