| Matter of Erin Estates, Inc. v McCracken |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 03707 [84 AD3d 1487] |
| May 5, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Erin Estates, Inc., Appellant, v John McCracken, asZoning Enforcement Officer of the Town of Erin, et al.,Respondents. |
—[*1] Personius, Mattison, Palmer & Bocek, Elmira (Timothy K. Mattison of counsel), forrespondents.
Garry, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (O'Shea, J.), entered May 20, 2010in Chemung County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLRarticle 78, to review a determination of respondent Town of Erin Zoning Board of Appealsprohibiting petitioner from placing a mobile home for sale on premises owned by it.
Petitioner operates a manufactured home park on real property that it owns in a residentialzone in the Town of Erin, Chemung County. Residents of the park place manufactured homes onlots leased from petitioner. In 2009, petitioner's property manager approached respondent JohnMcCracken, the Town of Erin Code Enforcement Officer, to inquire about obtaining a buildingpermit to install a manufactured home owned by petitioner on a lot in the park to be offered forsale to the public. McCracken advised petitioner that the proposal was a commercial useprohibited by the Town of Erin Zoning Code. Petitioner then applied to respondent Town of ErinZoning Board of Appeals (hereinafter ZBA) for an interpretation of the ordinance. After a publichearing, the ZBA determined that petitioner's proposed use was prohibited. Petitionercommenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding to annul that determination, and Supreme Courtdismissed the petition. Petitioner appeals.[*2]
The Town of Erin Zoning Code defines a manufacturedhome park as "[a] parcel of land under single ownership which is improved for the placement ofmobile homes and/or manufactured homes for non-transient use and which is offered to thepublic of two (2) or more mobile and/or manufactured homes [sic]" (Town of ErinZoning Code § 1300). In a provision entitled "Commercial Sale of Mobile and/orManufactured Homes," the zoning ordinance provides that "[a] mobile and/or manufacturedhome park shall be established for the purpose of permitting habitation of such mobile and/ormanufactured homes. No sales lot or area shall be used for the purpose of selling mobileand/or manufactured homes" (Town of Erin Zoning Code § 1301 [10] [emphasis added]).Relying upon the emphasized language, the ZBA found that petitioner's proposal to place anunoccupied manufactured home on a lot for sale "would have the effect of transforming saidresidential lot into a dedicated lot or area for the commercial sale of a mobile home" and was "anillegal commercial sale of a mobile home within a residential district." The ZBA furtherdistinguished petitioner's proposal from sales of mobile homes by individual owners "inanticipation of moving," finding that such "casual sales" did not violate the ordinance butnonetheless would "have to be monitored on a case by case basis."
Supreme Court accorded deference to the decision of the ZBA, but that heightened standardwas not merited here. A fact-based interpretation of a zoning ordinance that determines itsapplication to a particular use or property is entitled to "great deference" (Matter of West BeekmantownNeighborhood Assn., Inc. v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Beekmantown, 53 AD3d954, 956 [2008]; see Matter of New York Botanical Garden v Board of Stds. & Appealsof City of N.Y., 91 NY2d 413, 420-421 [1998]). However, "deference is not required whenreviewing a pure legal interpretation of terms in an ordinance" (Matter of Shannon v Village of RousesPoint Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 72 AD3d 1175, 1177 [2010]; see Matter of Mack v Board of Appeals,Town of Homer, 25 AD3d 977, 980 [2006]). Here, the meaning of the term "sales lot orarea" in the ordinance at issue presents a purely legal question in which no deference to theZBA's interpretation is required (see Matter of Shannon v Village of Rouses Point Zoning Bd.of Appeals, 72 AD3d at 1177; Matter of Blalock v Olney, 17 AD3d 842, 843-844 [2005]).
A statute or ordinance is to be construed as a whole, reading all of its parts together todetermine the legislative intent and to avoid rendering any of its language superfluous (see Friedman v Connecticut Gen. Life Ins.Co., 9 NY3d 105, 115 [2007]; Matter of Veysey v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of City ofGlens Falls, 154 AD2d 819, 821 [1989], lv denied 75 NY2d 708 [1990]; McKinney'sCons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 97). Unambiguous language is to be construed to"give effect to its plain meaning" (Matter of Tall Trees Constr. Corp. v Zoning Bd. ofAppeals of Town of Huntington, 97 NY2d 86, 91 [2001]; see Matter of Shannon vVillage of Rouses Point Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 72 AD3d at 1177). Applying theseprinciples to this ordinance, we find that its plain language does not support the ZBA'sinterpretation.
Read as a whole, Town of Erin Zoning Code § 1301 (10) identifies and prohibitscommercial sales within manufactured home parks by looking to the purpose of the contemplateduse of land in the park. The first sentence of the ordinance provides that manufactured homeparks are to be established for the purpose of "habitation." The second sentence prohibits the useof a "sales lot or area" within such a park for the contrasting "purpose of selling mobile and/ormanufactured homes." Nothing in the ordinance distinguishes between acceptable andunacceptable sales of homes according to the previous use of the home (that is, whether the homewas previously owned and occupied by a resident, or never occupied and owned by petitioner orsome other non-resident). Instead, the ordinance looks to the future, distinguishing betweenpermissible and impermissible uses based upon whether the home was placed in the park to be[*3]inhabited or to be sold.
The purpose of petitioner's proposal—by which a manufactured or mobile home wouldbe affixed to a residential lot within the park and then sold to be inhabited on that lot—isplainly that of "habitation." Thus, it does not fall within the use prohibited by theordinance—that is, the designation of a "sales lot or area" that has no residential purpose,but is dedicated instead to the display of model homes to be inspected by potential buyers andultimately resided in elsewhere. To construe the language otherwise would render the adjective"sales" in the phrase "sales lot or area" superfluous (see Matter of Tall Trees Constr. Corp. vZoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Huntington, 97 NY2d at 91). As petitioner's proposed usedoes not violate the Town of Erin Zoning Code, Supreme Court's judgment must be reversed.
Peters, J.P., Rose, Lahtinen and Malone Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isreversed, on the law, without costs, petition granted and determination annulled.