| Paolucci v Kamas |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 03823 [84 AD3d 766] |
| May 3, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Barbara Paolucci, Appellant, v Al Kamas et al.,Respondents. |
—[*1] Rivkin Radler LLP, Uniondale, N.Y. (Evan H. Krinick, Cheryl F. Korman, Harris J. Zakarin,and Todd Belous of counsel), for respondents.
In an action to recover damages for legal malpractice, the plaintiff appeals from a judgmentof the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Maltese, J.), dated June 1, 2009, which, upon an orderof the same court dated May 5, 2009, granting that branch of the defendants' motion which waspursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (8) to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, is infavor of the defendants and against her dismissing the complaint. The notice of appeal from theorder is deemed a notice of appeal from the judgment (see CPLR 5512 [a]).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
Personal jurisdiction can be conferred under CPLR 302 (a) (1) "even though the defendantnever enters New York, so long as the defendant's activities here were purposeful and there is asubstantial relationship between the transaction and the claim asserted" (Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc. v Montana Bd. ofInvs., 7 NY3d 65, 71 [2006], cert denied 549 US 1095 [2006]; see Fischbarg v Doucet, 9 NY3d375, 380 [2007]). Here, however, the Supreme Court properly determined that the number,nature, and quality of the defendants' contacts with New York do not evince purposeful activitiesby which the defendants availed themselves of the benefits and protections of New York law(see Weiss v Greenberg, Traurig, Askew, Hoffman, Lipoff, Quentel & Wolff, 85 AD2d861 [1981]; see also Kimco Exch. PlaceCorp. v Thomas Benz, Inc., 34 AD3d 433 [2006]; O'Brien v Hackensack Univ. Med.Ctr., 305 AD2d 199 [2003]; cf.Fischbarg v Doucet, 9 NY3d 375 [2007]; Grimaldi v Guinn, 72 AD3d 37 [2010]).
The Supreme Court also properly determined that personal jurisdiction over the defendantswas not conferred pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (3) based upon tortious activity occurring outsideNew York, causing injury within New York. The plaintiff failed to demonstrate prima facie thatthe defendants "[1] regularly do[ ] or solicit[ ] business, or engage[ ] in any other persistentcourse of conduct, or derive[ ] substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or servicesrendered, in the state," or "[2] expect[ ] or should reasonably expect the act to have consequencesin the state and derive[ ] substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce" (CPLR302 [a] [3] [i], [ii]; see Ingraham v Carroll, 90 NY2d 592 [1997]; cf. LaMarca vPak-Mor Mfg. Co., 95 NY2d 210 [2000]).[*2]
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted thatbranch of the defendants' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (8) to dismiss thecomplaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.
In light of our determination, we need not address the defendants' remaining contentions.Mastro, J.P., Skelos, Leventhal and Roman, JJ., concur. [Prior Case History: 2009 NY SlipOp 31143(U).]