| Dunbar v Prahovo Taxi, Inc. |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 03994 [84 AD3d 862] |
| May 10, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Louis J. Dunbar, Respondent, v Prahovo Taxi, Inc., et al.,Appellants. |
—[*1] Bamundo, Zwal & Schermerhorn, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Ben Bartolotta of counsel), forrespondent.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from an order ofthe Supreme Court, Queens County (Rosengarten, J.), entered November 19, 2010, which deniedtheir motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff didnot sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendants' motion forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.
The defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff, who allegedlysustained certain injuries to his left knee and left shoulder as a result of the subject motor vehicleaccident, did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d)as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345[2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendants submittedcompetent medical evidence establishing that the alleged injuries to the plaintiff's left knee didnot constitute a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614[2009]) and, in any event, were not caused by the subject accident (see Pamphile v Bastien, 61 AD3d659, 660 [2009]; Mohamed vSiffrain, 19 AD3d 561, 562 [2005]). The defendants also submitted competent medicalevidence establishing that the alleged injuries to the plaintiff's left shoulder were not caused bythe subject accident (see Singh v City ofNew York, 71 AD3d 1121, 1122 [2010]). Finally, the defendants established that theplaintiff's alleged injuries did not prevent the plaintiff from performing substantially all of thematerial acts constituting his customary daily activities during at least 90 of the first 180 daysfollowing the accident (see Ranford vTim's Tree & Lawn Serv., Inc., 71 AD3d 973 [2010]).
In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the allegedinjuries to his left knee constituted a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law §5102 (d) (see McLoud v Reyes, 82AD3d 848 [2011]) and as to whether the alleged injuries to his left shoulder were caused bythe subject accident (see Singh v City of New York, 71 AD3d at 1122). Finally, he failedto raise a triable issue of fact as to whether he sustained a serious injury under the [*2]90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a resultof the subject accident (see Jean vLabin-Natochenny, 77 AD3d 623, 624 [2010]).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the defendants' motion for summaryjudgment dismissing the complaint. Rivera, J.P., Angiolillo, Eng, Chambers and Sgroi, JJ.,concur.