| Ryan v City of New York |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 04032 [84 AD3d 926] |
| May 10, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Joseph Ryan, Respondent, v City of New York, Appellant,et al., Defendants. |
—[*1] Joseph T. Mullen, Jr., New York, N.Y. (Neil A. Zirlin of counsel), for respondent.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant City of New Yorkappeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Flug, J.), entered February 9,2010, which, upon a jury verdict, and upon the denial of its motion pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) toset aside the verdict and for judgment as a matter of law, is in favor of the plaintiff and against itin the principal sum of $447,640.45.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, the defendant's motionpursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) to set aside the verdict and for judgment as a matter of law is granted,and the complaint is dismissed insofar as asserted against the defendant City of New York.
The plaintiff commenced this action against, among others, the City of New York to recoverdamages for injuries he allegedly sustained when his motorcycle came into contact with defectsin the roadway, causing him to fall. After the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, theCity moved pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) to set aside the verdict and for judgment as a matter oflaw. The Supreme Court denied the motion, and entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff andagainst the City. We reverse.
"A motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to CPLR 4401 or 4404 may be grantedonly when the trial court determines that, upon the evidence presented, there is no valid line ofreasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly lead rational persons to theconclusion reached by the jury upon the evidence presented at trial, and no rational process bywhich the jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party" (Tapia v Dattco, Inc., 32 AD3d 842, 844 [2006]; see Szczerbiakv Pilat, 90 NY2d 553, 556 [1997]). Here, the trial court should have granted the City'smotion pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a), since the plaintiff failed to submit evidence sufficient toestablish, prima facie, that the City had prior written notice of the alleged defective condition thatpurportedly caused the accident or that there was written acknowledgment by the City of thedefective condition (see Administrative Code of City of NY § 7-201 [c]; Bruni v City of New York, 2 NY3d319 [2004]; Fraser v City of New York, 226 AD2d 424 [1996]). Rivera, J.P., Skelos,Sgroi and Miller, JJ., concur.