| DeGroat v DeGroat |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 04195 [84 AD3d 1012] |
| May 17, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Julie DeGroat, Respondent, v Stephen DeGroat,Appellant. |
—[*1] Jay Landa, Garden City, N.Y., for respondent.
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the defendant appeals, as limited by his noticeof appeal and brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Rockland County(Weiner, J.), dated January 29, 2010, as, upon a decision of the same court dated November 19,2009, made after a nonjury trial, (1) awarded to the plaintiff a sum equal to the value of 50% ofthe value of the parties' nonretirement marital assets, (2) determined that the proceeds of certainstock options constituted marital property, (3) determined that a bonus paid to him by his formeremployer, FSA, constituted marital property, and (4) directed him to pay to the plaintiff the sumof $250,000, representing 50% of the sum he withdrew from a certain bank account immediatelyprior to or after the commencement of the divorce action, plus interest.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
Trial courts are vested with broad discretion in making equitable distributions of maritalproperty (see Raville v Elnomany,76 AD3d 520, 521 [2010]; Saleh vSaleh, 40 AD3d 617, 617-618 [2007]; Bossard v Bossard, 199 AD2d 971[1993]). In exercising that broad discretion, courts must remember that "[a]lthough equitabledistribution is not necessarily equal distribution, where . . . both spouses equallycontribute to a marriage that is of long duration, a division of marital assets should be made thatis as equal as possible" (Miller v Miller, 128 AD2d 844, 845 [1987] [citation omitted]).Here, in light of, inter alia, the long duration of the marriage and the respective contributions ofthe parties, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in awarding to theplaintiff a sum equal to 50% of the value of the parties' nonretirement marital assets (seeDomestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [5] [d]; Raville v Elnomany, 76 AD3d at 522;Graves v Graves, 307 AD2d 1022, 1023-1024 [2003]; Meza v Meza, 294 AD2d414, 415-416 [2002]; cf. Adjmi vAdjmi, 8 AD3d 411, 412-413 [2004]).
The defendant contends that the Supreme Court erred in determining that the proceeds ofcertain stock options granted to him constituted marital property subject to equitable distribution.We disagree. Some of the stock options were granted to the defendant prior to the date of theparties' 1991 marriage, and those options initially constituted his separate property (seeDomestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [1] [d] [1], [3]). The remaining stock options weregranted to him after the date of the marriage, and all of the stock options were redeemed orexercised in 1996, during the marriage. The entire proceeds of the redemption of the stockoptions were subsequently commingled with marital funds in a certain investment account that,at the relevant time period, was titled jointly in the names of the parties. At trial, [*2]the defendant failed to demonstrate with "sufficient particularity"that any money in the investment account was directly traceable to those stock options that wereoriginally his separate property (Massimi v Massimi, 35 AD3d 400, 402 [2006]), inasmuch as hedid not produce relevant documentation as to deposits and withdrawals for the account. Underthese circumstances, the Supreme Court did not err in determining that the entire sumrepresenting the proceeds of the stock options, valued as of the date of trial, constituted maritalproperty (id. at 402; see Lynch v King, 284 AD2d 309, 310 [2001]).
The Supreme Court properly determined that a bonus received in 1996 by the defendant froma company known as FSA constituted marital property. Notably, the defendant commenced hisemployment at FSA five years into the marriage, and the entire period of his employment at FSAwas during the marriage (cf. DeJesus v DeJesus, 90 NY2d 643, 652 [1997]). Under thecircumstances, the Supreme Court did not err in finding that the defendant did not rebut thepresumption, applicable to property acquired during the marriage (id. at 648; see Tung Auyeung v Yinyin Mui, 82AD3d 477 [2011]), that the bonus constituted marital property (see DomesticRelations Law § 236 [B] [1] [c]; cf. DeJesus v DeJesus, 90 NY2d at 652).
Finally, the Supreme Court did not err in directing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff thesum of $250,000, 50% of the sum he withdrew from a joint bank account immediately prior to orafter the commencement of this action, as the record shows that this transaction was performed incontemplation of divorce (see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [5] [d] [12]; Xikis v Xikis, 43 AD3d 1040,1042 [2007]; Buchsbaum v Buchsbaum, 292 AD2d 553, 554 [2002]; Ferraro vFerraro, 257 AD2d 596, 597 [1999]). Mastro, J.P., Balkin, Leventhal and Belen, JJ., concur.