| Matter of Kellcie NN. (Sarah NN.) |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 04568 [85 AD3d 1251] |
| June 2, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Kellcie NN. and Another, Children Alleged to bePermanently Neglected. Tompkins County Department of Social Services, Respondent; SarahNN., Appellant. |
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Peters, J. Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Tompkins County (Rowley, J.),entered July 16, 2010, which granted petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to SocialServices Law § 384-b, to adjudicate respondent's children to be permanently neglected,and terminated respondent's parental rights.
Respondent is the mother of Kellcie NN. (born in 2006) and Keaniannin OO. (born in 2008).Shortly after Keaniannin's birth, it was discovered that respondent had, on more than oneoccasion, left the children alone in her apartment while a neighbor purportedly monitored themthrough a baby monitor. As a result, petitioner removed the children from respondent's care andplaced them in foster care, where they remain today. In December 2009, petitioner initiated thispermanent neglect proceeding against respondent seeking to terminate her parental rights. [*2]Respondent consented to a finding of permanent neglect and,following a dispositional hearing, Family Court determined that it would be in the children's bestinterests to terminate respondent's parental rights and free them for adoption. Respondent nowappeals.
Respondent's sole contention on this appeal is that Family Court abused its discretion interminating her parental rights, rather than granting her a suspended judgment. Following anadjudication of permanent neglect, a suspended judgment may be issued to allow a parentadditional time to improve parenting skills and demonstrate his or her fitness to care for the child(see Family Ct Act § 631 [b]; Matter of Kayla KK. [Tracy LL.], 68 AD3d 1207, 1208 [2009],lv denied 14 NY3d 707 [2010]; Matter of Nevaeh SS. [Valerie L.], 68 AD3d 1188, 1189 [2009]; Matter of Isaiah F., 55 AD3d1004, 1006 [2008]). The singular concern is the best interests of the child, and "there is nopresumption that any particular disposition, including the return of a child to a parent, promotessuch interests" (Matter of AngelicaVV., 53 AD3d 732, 733 [2008]; see Matter of Star Leslie W., 63 NY2d 136,147-148 [1984]; Matter of Faith R.,56 AD3d 982, 984 [2008]).
Here, according deference to Family Court's choice of dispositional alternatives (see Matter of Raine QQ., 51 AD3d1106, 1106 [2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 717 [2008]; Matter of James X., 37 AD3d1003, 1007 [2007]; Matter ofArianna OO., 29 AD3d 1117, 1118 [2006]), we find no basis upon which to disturb itsconclusion that the children's best interests would not be served by granting respondent thesecond chance provided by a suspended judgment. Respondent was incarcerated for much of thetime of the children's placement and, following her release, was arrested on three more occasions.Despite some recent progress by respondent, the hearing testimony established that she has ageneral distrust for petitioner and its caseworkers, has a history of arguing with service providersand professionals, and continues to blame others for the children's removal. She has repeatedlythreatened and harassed the foster parents, resulting in the issuance of a stay away order ofprotection in their favor. Her inappropriate behavior during visits with Kellcie resulted in thesuspension of visitation with that child, whom she had not seen for more than a year as of thedispositional hearing. Moreover, while attempting to regain custody, respondent had engaged inromantic relationships with individuals with troubled histories, including a man who wasconvicted of assault after breaking his own child's arm. The licensed psychologist who evaluatedrespondent testified that she has tendencies towards unlawful behavior and exhibits poor andimpulsive judgment, and opined that the children should not be returned to her care until thedeficiencies in her parenting skills are rectified and she is able to demonstrate a prolonged periodof stability in her emotional and social functioning.
Furthermore, at the time of the hearing, the children had been with the same foster family for20 months and, during that time, their behavioral problems and developmental delays hadsubstantially improved. They have developed a significant bond with the foster parents, whoexpressed a desire to adopt them, and are by all accounts thriving under their care. Taken as awhole, these facts provide a sound and substantial basis for Family Court's conclusion thattermination of respondent's parental rights was in the children's best interests (see Matter ofAidan D., 58 AD3d 906, 909 [2009]; Matter of Faith R., 56 AD3d at 985; Matter of Nahia M., 39 AD3d 918,921 [2007]; Matter of Douglas H.[Catherine H.], 1 AD3d 824, 826 [2003], lv denied 2 NY3d 701 [2004]).
Mercure, J.P., Lahtinen, Malone Jr. and Stein, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed,without costs.