| People v Quiles |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 04712 [84 AD3d 1415] |
| May 31, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v VictorQuiles, Appellant. |
—[*1] Janet DiFiore, District Attorney, White Plains, N.Y. (Maria I. Wager, Richard LongworthHecht, and Anthony J. Servino of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County(DiBella, J.), rendered August 31, 2007, convicting him of burglary in the second degree, petitlarceny, and criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree, upon a jury verdict, andimposing sentence. By decision and order dated June 22, 2010, this Court remitted the matter tothe Supreme Court, Westchester County, to hear and report on the defendant's challenge to theprosecutor's exercise of a peremptory challenge as to prospective juror Morant and held theappeal in abeyance in the interim (see People v Quiles, 74 AD3d 1241 [2010]). TheSupreme Court, Westchester County, has now filed its report. Justice Florio has been substitutedfor former Justice Santucci (see 22 NYCRR 670.1 [c]).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Upon remittitur, the Supreme Court properly concluded that the defendant's Batsonchallenge as to prospective juror Morant was not pretextual and, therefore, was without merit(see Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79 [1986]).
The Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in making itsSandoval ruling, and the defendant was not deprived of a fair trial by the Supreme Court'sSandoval ruling (see People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371, 374-375 [1974]), which,inter alia, permitted the People to ask the defendant about a prior burglary conviction and itsunderlying facts. The Supreme Court struck an appropriate balance between the probative valueof the underlying facts of the defendant's prior crime and the possible prejudice to him (seePeople v Grier, 47 AD3d 729 [2008]; People v Allan, 41 AD3d 727 [2007]).
The defendant's contention that his conviction of burglary in the second degree was notsupported by legally sufficient evidence is unpreserved for appellate review (see People vHawkins, 11 NY3d 484, 492 [2008]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light mostfavorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we findthat it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of that crime beyond a reasonabledoubt.
Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight ofthe evidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 [2007]), wenevertheless accord great [*2]deference to the jury's opportunityto view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v Mateo, 2NY3d 383, 410 [2004], cert denied 542 US 946 [2004]; People v Bleakley, 69NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guiltwas not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court properly included the 518 daysthat the defendant spent in a temporary release program in the toll of the 10-year period underPenal Law § 70.06 when determining that the defendant was a persistent violent felonyoffender (see People v Cagle, 7 NY3d 647 [2006]).
The defendant's remaining contention is unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event,without merit. Skelos, J.P., Florio, Belen and Hall, JJ., concur.