| Kettaneh v Board of Stds. & Appeals of the City of N.Y. |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 05410 [85 AD3d 620] |
| June 23, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| Nizam Peter Kettaneh et al., Appellants, v Board ofStandards and Appeals of the City of New York et al., Respondents. Landmark West! Inc. et al.,Appellants, v Board of Standards and Appeals of the City of New York et al., Respondents, et al.,Respondent. |
—[*1] Marcus Rosenberg & Diamond LLP, New York (David Rosenberg of counsel), forLandmark West! Inc., 91 Central Park West Corporation and Thomas Hansen, appellants. Jeffrey D. Friedlander, Assistant Corporation Counsel, New York (Ronald E. Sternberg ofcounsel), for municipal respondents. Proskauer Rose LLP, New York (Claude M. Millman of counsel), for Congregation ShearithIsrael, respondent.
Order and judgment (one paper), Supreme Court, New York County (Joan B. Lobis, J.),entered July 24, 2009, denying and dismissing the petition by Kettaneh and Lepow (the Kettanehpetitioners) to annul the determination of respondent Board of Standards and Appeals of the Cityof New York (BSA), dated August 26, 2008, and confirming the determination, unanimouslyaffirmed, without costs. Order and judgment (one paper), same court and Justice, entered October6, 2009, denying and dismissing the petition by Landmark West! Inc., 91 Central Park WestCorporation and Thomas Hansen (the Landmark petitioners) to annul the aforesaid [*2]determination, and confirming the determination, unanimouslyaffirmed, without costs.
In these CPLR article 78 proceedings, consolidated on appeal, petitioners challenge a zoningvariance granted by BSA to respondent Congregation Shearith Israel (the Congregation), anot-for-profit religious institution. The subject zoning lot is located on Manhattan's Upper WestSide and is currently occupied by the Congregation's landmarked synagogue, a connectedparsonage house and a community house. The Congregation plans to demolish the communityhouse and replace it with a nine-story community facility/residential building. The bottom fourfloors of the new building would be utilized for community purposes including a lobby/receptionspace for the synagogue, a toddler program, adult education and Hebrew school classes, acaretaker's unit and a Jewish day school; the upper five stories would be occupied by residentialmarket-rate condominium units.
Because the proposed building does not comply with zoning requirements, the Congregationsought a variance from BSA. The Congregation asserted that it needed a new facility so it couldbetter accommodate religious and educational programs for its growing membership. BSA held aseries of public hearings at which both proponents and opponents of the variance applicationtestified and made written submissions. In a resolution adopted August 26, 2008, BSA concludedthat the Congregation had shown its entitlement to the requested variance. BSA expresslyacknowledged and considered the arguments raised here by petitioners and found themunavailing. Petitioners then brought the instant proceedings challenging BSA's resolution. Indecisions rendered July 24, 2009 and October 6, 2009, Supreme Court confirmed BSA'sdetermination, finding that it was rationally based. We now affirm.
It is well settled that municipal zoning boards have wide discretion in consideringapplications for variances, and judicial review is limited to determining whether the board'saction was illegal, arbitrary or an abuse of discretion (Matter of Ifrah v Utschig, 98 NY2d304, 308 [2002]; Matter of SoHo Alliance v New York City Bd. of Stds. & Appeals, 95NY2d 437 [2000]). Thus, a determination by a zoning board should be upheld if it has a rationalbasis and is supported by substantial evidence (Matter of Ifrah at 308). In reviewing suchdeterminations, "courts consider 'substantial evidence' only to determine whether the recordcontains sufficient evidence to support the rationality of the Board's determination" (Matter ofSasso v Osgood, 86 NY2d 374, 384 n 2 [1995]).
"In order to issue the variances here, the BSA was required [under section 72-21 of the NewYork City Zoning Resolution] to find that the proposed development met five specificrequirements: that (a) because of 'unique physical conditions' of the property, conforming useswould impose 'practical difficulties or unnecessary hardship;' (b) also due to the unique physicalconditions, conforming uses would not 'enable the owner to realize a reasonable return' from thezoned property; (c) the proposed variances would 'not alter the essential character of theneighborhood or district;' (d) the owner did not create the practical difficulties or unnecessaryhardship; and (e) only the 'minimum variance necessary to afford relief' is sought" (Matter ofSoHo Alliance, 95 NY2d at 440; see NY City Zoning Resolution § 72-21)."[I]n questions relating to its expertise, the BSA's interpretation of the [Zoning Resolution's]terms must be given great weight and judicial deference, so long as the interpretation is neitherirrational, unreasonable nor inconsistent with the governing statute" (Matter of Toys "R" Us vSilva, 89 NY2d 411, 418-419 [1996] [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]).
We conclude that BSA's finding that the proposed building satisfies each of the five criteriafor a variance set forth in section 72-21 has a rational basis and is supported by substantial [*3]evidence (see Matter of SoHo Alliance, 95 NY2d at 440).BSA rationally found that there are "unique physical conditions" peculiar to and inherent in thezoning lot such that strict compliance with the zoning requirements would impose "practicaldifficulties or unnecessary hardship" (NY City Zoning Resolution § 72-21 [a]). Among thephysical conditions BSA considered unique was that the zoning lot in question straddles twozoning districts: part of the lot is in the R10A zoning district and the remainder is in zoningdistrict R8B, which has much stricter zoning requirements. BSA rationally concluded that thelocation of the zoning district boundary in the middle of the development site constrained anas-of-right development by imposing different height and setback limitations on the two portionsof the single zoning lot.
The location of the zoning district boundary, along with other factors, including theCongregation's need to preserve the existing synagogue, provides a rational basis for BSA'sfinding of unique physical conditions (see Matter of Elliott v Galvin, 33 NY2d 594, 596[1973]). Although four nearby lots are also intersected by a zoning district boundary, it cannot besaid that this condition is "common to the whole neighborhood" (Matter of Vomero v City of New York,13 NY3d 840, 841 [2009] [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]; see alsoMatter of Douglaston Civic Assn. v Klein, 51 NY2d 963, 965 [1980] ["Uniqueness does notrequire that only the parcel of land in question and none other be affected by the condition whichcreates the hardship"]). There is no merit to the contention that the requirement of uniquephysical conditions refers only to land and not buildings (Matter of UOB Realty [USA] vChin, 291 AD2d 248 [2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 607 [2002]).
Section 72-21 (b) of the NY City Zoning Resolution requires a finding that due to the uniquephysical conditions, conforming uses would not "enable the owner to realize a reasonable return"from the zoned property. This finding, however, is not required for the granting of a variance to anonprofit organization (NY City Zoning Resolution § 72-21 [b]). Nevertheless, BSAdetermined that because the planned condominiums were unrelated to the Congregation'smission, the Congregation was required to establish its inability to obtain a reasonable returnfrom the residential portion of the proposed building. BSA then found, based on expertsubmissions and its own analysis, that the Congregation made the requisite showing.
On appeal, the Congregation contends that as a nonprofit entity, it is exempt from the section72-21 (b) showing despite the fact that residential condominiums are a major part of its planneddevelopment. We need not reach this issue because BSA rationally concluded that due to theunique physical conditions, the Congregation could not realize a reasonable return from anas-of-right building. In making that finding, BSA reasonably relied upon "expert testimonysubmitted by the owners based upon significant documentation, including detailed economicanalysis" (Matter of SoHo Alliance, 95 NY2d at 441). There was substantial evidence tosupport the remaining section 72-21 findings.
There is no merit to the Landmark petitioners' contention that BSA lacked jurisdiction togrant the variance here. Section 666 (6) (a) of the New York City Charter gives BSA the powerto hear and decide appeals from determinations made by the commissioner of buildings, or, ifproperly designated, a deputy commissioner or a borough superintendent of buildings. Here, theLandmark petitioners contend that the objections issued by the Department of Buildings afterreview of the plans were not signed by any of these officials. However, any such failure is of noconsequence because section 666 (5) of the NY City Charter provides an independent basis forBSA's [*4]jurisdiction. Under that subdivision, BSA has thepower to "determine and vary the application of the zoning resolution as may be provided in suchresolution and pursuant to section [668 of the NY City Charter]" (see Matter of HighpointEnters. v Board of Estimate of City of N.Y., 67 AD2d 914, 916 [1979], affd 47NY2d 935 [1979]; William Israel's Farm Coop. v Board of Stds. & Appeals of City ofN.Y., 22 Misc 3d 1105[A], 2004 NY Slip Op 51953[U] [2004], appeal dismissed 25AD3d 517 [2006]). Sincesection 668 does not require a final determination executed by one of the designated officials,BSA properly entertained the instant variance application.
We have considered petitioners' remaining arguments and find them without merit.Concur—Mazzarelli, J.P., Renwick, DeGrasse, Freedman and Richter, JJ. [Prior CaseHistory: 2009 NY Slip Op 31548(U).]