| Jimenez v RC Church of Epiphany |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 05456 [85 AD3d 974] |
| June 21, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Manuel Jimenez et al., Respondents, v RC Church ofEpiphany, Appellant. |
—[*1] Roura & Melamed (Alexander J. Wulwick, New York, N.Y., of counsel), forrespondents.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order ofthe Supreme Court, Kings County (Jacobson, J.), dated June 23, 2010, which granted theplaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the causes of action alleginga violation of Labor Law § 240 (1).
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
While painting the walls of the defendant's church, the plaintiffs allegedly placed a closedA-frame ladder atop a scaffold and leaned the ladder against the wall, as their supervisors hadinstructed them. Although the plaintiffs locked the wheels of the scaffold, the scaffold movedaway from the wall while one of the plaintiffs was on the ladder and the other plaintiff wasstanding on the scaffold bracing the ladder. Both plaintiffs fell and were injured. The plaintiffscommenced this action against the defendant alleging, inter alia, a violation of Labor Law§ 240 (1), in that the defendant's failure to provide them with an adequate safety device fortheir work, which undisputedly involved a "risk arising from a physically significant elevationdifferential," proximately caused their injuries (Runner v New York Stock Exch., Inc., 13 NY3d 599, 603 [2009]).Following completion of discovery, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the issue ofliability on their Labor Law § 240 (1) causes of action. The Supreme Court granted theirmotion, the defendant appeals, and we affirm.
To recover on a cause of action based on a violation of Labor Law § 240 (1), a plaintiffmust demonstrate that his or her injuries were "the direct consequence of a failure to provideadequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant elevation differential"(Runner v New York Stock Exch., Inc., 13 NY3d at 603; see Quinteros v P. Deblasio, Inc., 82AD3d 861, 862 [2011]; La Veglia vSt. Francis Hosp., 78 AD3d 1123, 1126-1127 [2010]).
Here, the plaintiffs established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of lawby submitting evidence sufficient to demonstrate that the defendant failed to provide them withan adequate safety device or ensure that such device was properly placed, and that the defendant'sfailure was a [*2]proximate cause of their injuries (seeLabor Law § 240 [1]; Runner v New York Stock Exch., Inc., 13 NY3d at 603; Leconte v 80 E. End Owners Corp., 80AD3d 669, 671 [2011]; Blair v Cristani, 296 AD2d 471, 472 [2002]; Ekere vAirmont Indus. Park, 249 AD2d 104 [1998]). In opposition, the defendant failed to raise atriable issue of fact (see Leconte v 80 E. End Owners Corp., 80 AD3d at 671). Therefore,the Supreme Court properly granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the issue ofliability on their Labor Law § 240 (1) causes of action. Angiolillo, J.P., Balkin, Dickersonand Cohen, JJ., concur.