| Ogunmoyin v 1515 Broadway Fee Owner, LLC |
| 2011 NY Slip Op 05469 [85 AD3d 991] |
| June 21, 2011 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Josephine Ogunmoyin, Appellant, v 1515 Broadway FeeOwner, LLC, et al., Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs-Respondents, and SL Green Realty Corp.et al., Respondents. Broadway Restaurant Associates, LLC, Doing Business as Bolzano's,Third-Party Defendant-Respondent. |
—[*1] Hoey, King, Toker & Epstein, New York, N.Y. (John A. Serio of counsel), for defendants/third-party plaintiffs-respondents 1515 Broadway Fee Owner, LLC, and SL Green Realty Corp.and defendant-respondent SL Green Management, LLC. Curan, Ahlers, Fiden & Norris, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Austin Jacobson of counsel), fordefendant-respondent First Quality Maintenance, L.P. Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Frank D. Thompson II of counsel),for defendant-respondent Aramark. McElfish Law Firm, New York, N.Y. (Teresa A. Gruber of counsel), for third-partydefendant-respondent.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order ofthe Supreme Court, Kings County (Bayne, J.), dated April 16, 2010, which denied her motionpursuant to CPLR 5015 to vacate so much of an order of the same court dated November 13,2009, as, upon her default, granted the defendants' separate motions for summary judgmentdismissing the complaint.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
To vacate so much of the order dated November 13, 2009, as was entered upon the plaintiff'sdefault in opposing the defendants' separate motions for summary judgment dismissing thecomplaint, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default anda potentionally meritorious opposition to the motions for summary judgment (see Joseph v GMAC Leasing Corp., 44AD3d 905 [2007]; Rockland Tr.Mix, Inc. v Rockland Enters., Inc., 28 AD3d 630, 630 [2006]; Henry v Kuveke, 9 AD3d 476, 479[2004]). While law office failure can be accepted as a reasonable excuse in the exercise of acourt's sound discretion, the movant must submit supporting facts to explain and justify thedefault, and mere neglect is not accepted as a reasonable excuse (see Morrison vRosenberg, 278 AD2d [*2]392, 392 [2000];Cole-Hatchard v Grand Union, 270 AD2d 447, 447 [2000]; De Vito v MarineMidland Bank, 100 AD2d 530, 531 [1984]).
Here, the plaintiff's proffered excuse of law office failure was vague and unsubstantiated and,thus, did not constitute a reasonable excuse for the default (see Knowles v Schaeffer, 70 AD3d 897, 898 [2010]; Chechen v Spencer, 68 AD3d 801,802 [2009]; Murray v New York CityHealth & Hosps. Corp., 52 AD3d 792, 793 [2008]; St. Luke's Roosevelt Hosp. v Blue Ridge Ins. Co., 21 AD3d 946,947 [2005]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying theplaintiff's motion to vacate so much of the order dated November 13, 2009, as was entered uponher default in opposing the defendants' separate motions for summary judgment dismissing thecomplaint (see Star Indus., Inc. vInnovative Beverages, Inc., 55 AD3d 903, 904 [2008]; Antoine v Bee, 26 AD3d 306[2006]; Matter of Hye-Young Chon vCountry-Wide Ins. Co., 22 AD3d 849 [2005]).
In light of the foregoing, we need not reach the plaintiff's remaining contention. Mastro, J.P.,Dickerson, Chambers and Roman, JJ., concur.